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Advisor: Thomas C. Omer  
This study examines registrants’ incentives to disclose internal control 
weaknesses (ICWs) voluntarily in IPO registration statements and their post-IPO 
financial reporting quality.  Using a sample of initial public offering (IPO) registrants 
from 2005-2013, I find that increasing management’s disclosure credibility, by hiring a 
new CEO in the IPO, is an incentive to include ICWs in IPO registration statements.  I 
find that management does build credibility with underwriters evidenced by IPO 
registrants that disclose ICWs voluntarily are associated with higher IPO offer prices.  
The results suggest that registrants including voluntary ICW disclosures are more likely 
to receive an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion. I find that registrants' voluntary ICW 
disclosures are informative and are associated with negative cumulative abnormal returns 
only when an auditor issues an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion after the disclosure.  
IPO registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs and receive unqualified SOX 404 auditor 
opinions appear to be successful in mitigating negative cumulative abnormal returns.  My 
findings provide evidence that misstatements appear to outpace material weakness 
disclosures for the sample of IPO registrants. Overall, the findings suggest that managers 
seek to build credibility through voluntary disclosure of ICWs at the IPO, allowing 
managers to maximize the rewards at the IPO date (i.e., IPO offer price). However, 
managers suffer punishment from investors if subsequent events (i.e., SOX 404 material 
weaknesses) call into question the credibility of the disclosure.  The post-IPO financial 
 
 
reporting quality results are timely and relevant to regulators because the relationship 
between misstatements and unqualified audit opinions is puzzling. Additionally, the 
JOBS Act allows IPO registrants to delay SOX 404 compliance for up to five years. 
Finally, this study’s results are important to investors because the purpose of SOX 404 is 
to provide an advanced warning of financial reporting weaknesses. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 This study examines registrants’ incentives to reveal information on lower quality 
financial reporting before public trading and their post initial public offering (IPO) 
financial reporting quality.  At the time of their IPO, registrants are not required to 
comply with the internal control reporting requirements of either section 404(a) or 404(b) 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 404).1  The delayed compliance for registrants’ 
internal control assessments may increase the likelihood that internal control weaknesses 
(ICWs) remain when IPOs begin publicly trading. However, some IPO registrants 
voluntarily disclose information relating to internal controls before their public offering. 
To date, there has been little research on the incentives IPO registrants have to disclose 
this information or the effects of the disclosure. I examine whether management includes 
voluntary ICW disclosures in their IPO registration statements to increase management’s 
disclosure credibility before public trading. I also examine the association between 
voluntary ICW disclosures and post-IPO financial reporting quality. 
Understanding IPO registrants’ incentives to disclose ICWs and the effects of the 
disclosure is important because market participants seeking information on the reliability 
of IPO’s financial statements are likely to use managements’ voluntary disclosures 
because IPO registrants lack a financial reporting history that comes with public trading.  
I suggest that IPO registrants’ disclose ICWs voluntarily to increase management’s 
disclosure credibility.  Following Mercer (2004) disclosure credibility is defined as 
“investors’ perceptions of the believability of a particular disclosure.”  Disclosure 
                                                 
1 SOX section 404(a) requires management to evaluate internal controls and section 404(b) requires 
auditors to evaluate internal controls .   
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credibility reflects not only whether a disclosure is true or false, but also more broadly, 
whether the disclosure of ICWs fairly represents the registrants’ internal control 
assessment at the IPO date.  Key factors to consider when assessing disclosure credibility 
include management’s credibility, situational incentives at the disclosure date, the degree 
of internal and external assurance, and characteristics of the disclosure itself (Mercer 
2004).  Because management voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration 
statement, external assurance provided by the auditor cannot be examined.  Thus, this 
study focuses on management’s voluntary disclosures given the situational incentives for 
IPO registrants. 
Consistent with Mercer (2004), management’s disclosure credibility is defined as 
“management’s perceived trustworthiness and competence in financial disclosure.”  For 
IPO registrants, management has not engaged in repeated interactions with investors.  
Instead, management attempts to increase disclosure credibility to maximize rewards and 
minimize punishments (Leary and Kowalski 1990).  Thus, IPO management may 
voluntarily disclose ICWs because it reveals management’s understanding of the risks in 
the business and whether they are actively managing them (Deumes and Knechel 2008; 
Barry and Brown 1986).  Transparency regarding the financial reporting aspects that need 
improvement helps IPO management increase their disclosure credibility associated with 
voluntarily disclosing ICWs in their IPO registration statement.   
Ex-ante, registrants have incentives to disclose ICWs voluntarily. The Securities 
Act of 1933 holds liable all parties participating in the IPO registration for any material 
misstatements or omissions in the registration statement. Thus, management has an 
3 
 
 
 
incentive to build credibility with investors to avoid potential litigation costs (Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Collins, and Kinney 2007; Hermanson and Ye 2009; Basu, Krishnan, Lee, and 
Zhang 2013).  Prior research also suggests that bad news disclosures are inherently more 
credible than good news disclosures (Mercer 2004; Hutton, Miller, and Skinner 2003; 
Frost 1997; Williams 1996).  Thus, voluntary ICW disclosures in an IPO registration 
statement, arguably bad news, may be seen as more credible and have a positive effect on 
managements’ disclosure credibility.     
IPO management also has an incentive to build credibility with underwriters to 
maximize the IPO offer price. Anecdotal evidence suggests that underwriters expect IPO 
registrants to complete SOX 404 readiness assessments before pricing the IPO.  Thus, if 
management discloses ICWs in their IPO registration statements, underwriters likely 
value the lower information asymmetry when assigning offer prices.  Concurrent research 
provides supporting evidence that voluntary disclosures of ICWs and related remediation 
procedures are associated with less IPO underpricing (Basu et al. 2013).  In contrast with 
Basu et al. (2013) who examine investors’ perceptions of registrants’ intrinsic value (i.e., 
underpricing), this study examines the underwriters’ assessment of registrants’ offer 
value.  
Additionally, voluntary disclosures reduce information asymmetry between IPO 
management and investors and reduces agency costs (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 
1991; Kanodia and Lee 1988; Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 2001; Berger and Hann 
2003; Bens and Monahan 2004; Basu et al. 2013).  Voluntary disclosures indicate 
management accepts a greater level of external monitoring which likely improves the 
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relationship between management and investors.  One scenario that can provide insights 
on the trust built between management and investors is to examine the association 
between voluntarily disclosed ICWs in IPO registration statements and the likelihood of 
material weaknesses disclosed in registrants’ first SOX 404 auditor opinion and the 
related market reaction.  Prior literature suggests that resource constrained companies 
(e.g., IPO registrants) are less likely to remediate internal control deficiencies (Bedard, 
Hoitash, Hoitash, and Westermann 2012; Czerney 2015).  Thus, voluntarily disclosed 
ICWs may persist resulting in material weaknesses disclosed in registrants’ first SOX 404 
auditor opinions.  If management discloses ICWs in their IPO registration statements, 
investors may reduce punishment when subsequent negative events (i.e., SOX 404 
material weaknesses) occur because of the trust gained by managers through voluntary 
ICW disclosures in the IPO registration statement.  By disclosing ICWs the manager 
informs investors about the business processes that need improvement.  However, 
voluntary earnings forecasts literature suggests investor responses are more pronounced 
when bad news persists after an early warning (Rees and Sivaramakrishnan 2007).  
Additionally, prior research finds an association between voluntary disclosure of non-
material ICWs and more negative abnormal returns; especially when the voluntary 
disclosure occurs in the context of previous suspicious events (Kim and Park 2009).   
Recent academic research suggests concerns about the reliability of SOX 404 
reports for public companies, and whether the effectiveness of SOX 404 is a signal of 
potential accounting problems (Rice and Weber 2012; Plumlee and Yohn 2010; Li and 
Wang 2006).  Examining a setting of IPOs and future misstatements offers the 
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opportunity to investigate audit quality in the post-SOX era.  A general audit quality 
framework includes four components: inputs, processes, outputs and opinions, and audit 
contexts (Francis 2011; Bedard, Johnstone, and Smith 2010; DeFond and Zhang 2014; 
Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, and Velury 2013).  I suggest that IPO registrants’ 
voluntarily disclosed ICWs are increased risks that auditors should consider when 
performing subsequent audits.  I examine whether ICWs disclosed at the IPO date lead to 
misstatements within three years of the IPO date. Thus, I link audit quality to financial 
reporting quality. 
To investigate the incentives for voluntary disclosure and the consequences of the 
disclosures, I identify IPO registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs in their registration 
statements. First, I examine the association between attempts to increase management’s 
disclosure credibility and voluntary ICW disclosures.  Prior studies investigating 
management’s voluntary internal control disclosures before the passage of SOX 404 
suggest that more credible companies (i.e., Fortune 100 companies) are more likely than 
smaller companies (potentially less credible) to report on internal controls (Raghunandan 
and Rama 1994; McMullen, Raghunandan, and Rama 1996).  Second, I examine the 
association between voluntary ICW disclosures and IPO offer prices to determine if 
voluntary disclosure effects IPO offer prices.  Third, I examine the association between 
voluntary ICW disclosures and the likelihood of the identification of SOX 404 material 
weaknesses in the first post-IPO SOX 404 auditor opinion.  Fourth, I examine cumulative 
abnormal returns during the three-day window surrounding the identification of SOX 404 
material weaknesses in the first post-IPO SOX 404 auditor opinion to determine if early 
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disclosure of ICWs builds credibility with investors.  Finally, I examine the association 
between voluntary ICW disclosures and post-IPO misstatements occurring within three 
years of the IPO date. 
Using a sample of IPO registration statements from 2005 to 2013, I find that IPO 
registrants with a new CEO, who likely have the greatest incentive to increase their 
management disclosure credibility, are more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily. I also 
find that underwriters assign higher prices to registrants disclosing ICWs suggesting that 
attempts to increase disclosure credibility are successful in this context.  My results 
suggest that IPO registrants that are voluntarily disclosing ICWs are more likely to report 
material weaknesses under SOX 404.  
Additionally, I find negative abnormal returns for IPO registrants that voluntarily 
disclosed ICWs and received adverse SOX 404 audit opinions.  This result suggests that 
attempts to establish disclosure credibility fail if remediation of disclosed ICWs does not 
occur.  On the other hand, IPO registrants that voluntarily disclosed ICWs but 
subsequently remediated the control issue experienced abnormal returns that were not 
different than those IPO registrants that did not disclose ICWs and received a clean SOX 
404 audit opinion. Thus, the IPO registrants that disclose ICWs voluntarily and remediate 
those before SOX 404 compliance is mandatory appear to be successful in establishing 
management’s disclosure credibility.  Finally, the results suggest that the increased risks 
associated with voluntary disclosure of internal control weaknesses are not adjusted for 
by auditors when conducting subsequent audits. I also find that registrants whose auditor 
opinion in the IPO registration statement includes an explanatory paragraph stating that 
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the auditor did not audit internal controls over financial reporting are more likely to 
misstate their financial statements in a year in which the internal control over financial 
reporting opinion is unqualified. This finding suggests that the auditor does appear to 
have knowledge about internal controls at the IPO date. However, the auditor does not 
provide advanced warning of continued internal control deficiencies before the post-IPO 
financial statement misstatements. 
This study contributes to five streams of accounting literature. First, this study 
adds to the research on the effects of SOX by evaluating the market reaction to SOX 404 
material weakness disclosures when preceded by voluntary ICW disclosures. Current 
research focusing on voluntary ICW disclosures uses SOX Section 302 disclosures to 
investigate whether the information content of the disclosures increases with the severity 
of the control weakness (Kim and Park 2009; Beneish, Billings, and Hodder 2008; 
Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare 2008).  Prior research suggests that the market 
does not react to SOX 404 disclosures. However, the market does react to SOX 302 
disclosures (Kim and Park 2009; Hammersley et al. 2008; Beneish et al. 2008; Franco, 
Guan, and Lu 2005).  Examining voluntary disclosure of ICWs in an IPO setting allows 
examination of voluntary ICW disclosures that address the integrity of individual 
registrants’ financial reporting processes before SOX 302 and SOX 404 ICW disclosures 
are required.        
Second, this study contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosures.  Prior 
research finds that voluntary management disclosures are useful in the evaluation of IPO 
companies (Guo, Lev, Zhou 2004; Leone, Rock and Willenborg 2007; Schrand and 
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Verrecchia 2002; Barth, Landsman, and Taylor 2014).  This study extends the disclosure 
literature by investigating the association between IPO registrants’ voluntary disclosures 
and IPO offer prices.  Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) call for examining a 
combination of voluntary disclosures and mandatory disclosures. This study provides a 
setting to examine voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements and 
subsequent mandatory disclosures of SOX 404 material weaknesses jointly. 
Third, this study contributes to the disclosure literature by providing evidence on 
whether management’s attempts to increase their disclosure credibility by disclosing 
ICWs results in benefits to the IPO. Given management’s incentive to build a reputation 
with investors, understanding whether voluntary ICW disclosures help registrants 
maximize rewards and minimize punishments is important. 
Fourth, this study contributes to the debate on the relation between ICWs and 
financial reporting quality. The internal control literature calls for using a range of 
financial reporting quality proxies and examining the relation between ICWs and 
financial reporting quality for the smaller company segment in the market (Schneider, 
Gramling, Hermanson, and Ye 2009). I extend this line of research by using a sample of 
IPO registrants and misstatements to measure financial reporting quality (DeFond and 
Zhang 2014). 
Fifth, this study contributes to the debate regarding whether SOX 404 is effective 
in reducing future misstatements. My findings extend the misstatement literature with 
evidence that voluntary ICW disclosures are not reliable signals of future misstatements. 
The results suggest the auditing process was not adjusted for increased risk, proxied by 
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the voluntary disclosure of ICWs or auditors including an explanatory paragraph 
indicating no opinion on internal control over financial reporting is given. This result 
complements the prior literature because IPO registrants provide a setting to examine the 
auditing process and the subsequent output for the entire tenure as a public company. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 summarizes SOX 
regulation, voluntary disclosure in the IPO setting, and develops the hypotheses. In 
Chapter 3, I describe the research design and sample.  Chapter 4 provides descriptive 
statistics and the results of the analyses.  In Chapter 5, I discuss additional analyses and 
results.  Chapter 6 provides the conclusion. 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 SOX Regulation  
 Effective internal control over financial reporting improves management’s 
disclosure credibility to the financial markets (Franzel 2015; PCAOB 2004; COSO 
2006). The regulations regarding when and if IPO registrants must comply with SOX 404 
have continued to evolve since the SOX 404 legislation enactment.2  Examining 
voluntary disclosure of issues related to internal control over financial reporting offers a 
setting to examine both the incentives to disclose before public trading and the 
consequence of those disclosures after public trading requires mandatory disclosure.  This 
                                                 
2 November 15, 2004 was the starting date for SOX 404 compliance for companies with market 
capitalization greater than $75 million.  July 15, 2005, was the starting date for SOX 404 compliance for 
companies with a market capitalization less than $75 million.  On September 25, 2010, the SEC 
permanently exempted companies that are neither accelerated filers nor large accelerated filers from SOX 
404.  Approximately 4% of IPO registrants filing between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2013 met the 
permanent exemption requirements.  On April 5, 2012, the SEC enacted the JOBS Act permitting EGC IPO 
registrants to delay SOX 404 (b) compliance for up to five years.   
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study examines management’s voluntary disclosure of ICWs in IPO registration 
statements to understand whether these voluntary disclosures benefit IPO registrants. 
 The academic literature and regulators agree that to moderate investor skepticism 
about disclosure credibility, internal control disclosures should be meaningful (i.e., 
companies do not fail to report deficiencies when internal controls are ineffective).3  
However, several commentators have questioned internal control reports’ disclosure 
credibility because of apparent failures to identify ICWs (Whitehouse 2015; Glass Lewis 
2007, IMA 2008, SEC 2009).  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) states, “a 
central purpose of the assessment of internal control over financial reporting is to identify 
material weaknesses that have, by their very definition, more than a remote likelihood of 
leading to a material misstatement in the financial statements” (SEC 2005; Rice, Weber, 
Wu 2014). The SOX 404 exemptions for IPO registrants are unusual because material 
weakness disclosures are more informative for companies that are smaller and likely have 
higher pre-disclosure information asymmetry (e.g., IPO registrants) and material 
weakness disclosures are declining (Beneish et al. 2008; Whitehouse 2015).  
While SOX 404 is intended to improve public companies’ information reliability, 
compliance costs are often significant (COSO 2006; PCAOB 2004). The Jumpstart Our 
Business Start-ups (JOBS) Act of 2012 was enacted on April 5, 2012, to ease the 
transition from a private to a public company (SEC 2012). Title 1 of the JOBS Act allows 
an exemption from compliance with SOX 404(b) for up to five years for those IPOs 
                                                 
3 The PCAOB asserts, “For the implementation of Section 404 of the Act to achieve its objectives, the 
public must have confidence that all material weaknesses that exist as of the company’s year-end will be 
publicly reported” (PCAOB 2004, paragraph 94). 
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classified as emerging growth companies (EGC). Nearly all IPOs priced after April 5, 
2012, utilized the JOBS Act accommodation to defer compliance with SOX 404(b) 
(Latham and Watkins 2014). Approximately 25 percent of these EGCs voluntarily 
disclosed a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal controls over financial 
reporting (Latham and Watkins 2014). None of the EGCs that voluntarily disclosed a 
significant deficiency or material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting 
indicated an intention to comply with SOX 404 before the JOBS Act accommodation 
expired (Latham and Watkins 2013). Market participants seeking insight into the current 
and future internal control effectiveness of IPO registrants must rely on information other 
than an explicit opinion from the auditor (Czerney 2015). Thus, it is not apparent why 
delaying SOX 404 compliance for IPO registrants would not harm their financial 
reporting quality. This study extends the literature on ICWs by examining IPO 
registrants’ incentives to identify and disclose ICWs voluntarily when entering the 
financial markets and the voluntary ICW disclosures’ effect on post-IPO financial 
reporting quality. 
2.2 Voluntary Disclosure – IPO Setting 
 SOX 404 requires communicating information to investors about weaknesses in 
public companies’ systems of internal controls that may increase the likelihood of 
financial statement errors.  However, IPO registrants are not required to comply with 
SOX 404 until the second annual report after the IPO.  IPO management may include 
voluntary disclosures in their IPO registration statements to increase management’s 
disclosure credibility (Guo et al. 2004; Leone et al. 2007).  The limited corporate 
12 
 
 
 
information environment for IPO registrants inhibits external parties’ ability to judge the 
reliability of management’s reported accounting numbers (Aharony, Lin, and Loeb 1993; 
Friedlan 1994; Fan 2007).  Thus, investors may use voluntary disclosure of ICWs to infer 
management’s disclosure credibility.   
2.3 Management’s Disclosure Credibility 
 Management’s credibility, characteristics of managements’ disclosures, and 
situational incentives at the time of disclosure influence management’s disclosure 
credibility.  Social psychology research suggests an important factor in a message’s 
credibility is the credibility of the messenger (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979). Williams 
(1996) finds that managers can build disclosure reputations that increase the believability 
of their subsequent disclosures.  Experimental research also corroborates that 
management’s credibility is important to disclosure credibility (Hirst, Koonce, and Miller 
1999; Hodge, Hopkins, and Pratt 2006).  IPO registrants do not have a financial reporting 
history or repeated interactions with investors at the time of the IPO. Therefore, it is 
likely crucial at least for some IPO management to establish credibility with financial 
market participants. 
At the most general level, management’s motive to establish credibility is the 
maximization of expected rewards and minimization of expected punishments (Leary and 
Kowalski 1990; Schlenker 1980).  Schlenker (1980) proposed that people maximize their 
reward-cost ratio dealing with others through self-presentation.  People are motivated to 
assert images with the highest potential value, although other factors also determine 
people’s motivation to portray particular images (Schlenker 1980).  I suggest that 
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voluntary ICW disclosures in an IPO registration statement convey the impression that 
management is aware of the financial reporting aspects that need improvement.  Thus, 
IPO management can increase the likelihood that they will obtain desired outcomes (e.g., 
maximize IPO offer price) and avoid undesired outcomes (e.g., Securities Act of 1933 
litigation and negative investor reactions to post-IPO negative events) by using voluntary 
ICW disclosures.   
 The characteristics of voluntary ICW disclosures also influence management’s 
disclosure credibility.  These characteristics include the ICW disclosures’ precision, 
venue, and time horizon, whether supporting information accompanies the disclosure as 
well as the inherent plausibility of the ICWs disclosed. Prior research provides evidence 
on an association between disclosure credibility and increased precision (Hirst et al. 
1999; Hassell, Jennings, and Lasser 1998; Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell 1993; King, 
Pownall, and Waymire 1990).  Mercer (2004) suggests that companies that operate in 
uncertain environments gain credibility by conceding these uncertainties and providing 
less precise forecasts.  This acknowledgment of uncertainty suggests that disclosures that 
conform to the underlying uncertainty are more credible than those that do not.  I suggest 
that disclosing ICW issues in the uncertain IPO environment acknowledges the 
uncertainty in IPO financial statements and may increase the management’s disclosure 
credibility. 
 Prior research also provides evidence that management credibility and supporting 
information matter most when management has incentives to mislead (Mercer 2004).  
When incentives to mislead are low, disclosures are inherently believable and other 
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credibility enhancing mechanisms do not provide additional benefits (Mercer 2004).  
Hutton et al. (2003) find that bad news disclosures are inherently more credible and do 
not require supporting information to increase credibility.  I suggest that voluntary ICW 
disclosures in IPO registration statements are inherently bad news; therefore, including 
these disclosures may also increase management’s disclosure credibility.   
 Finally, the inherent plausibility of the information disclosed can influence 
management disclosure’s credibility.  Prior literature suggests an association between 
increased investor skepticism and information that deviates from prior expectations 
(Koch 2002; Hansen and Noe 1998; Williams 1996; Koehler 1993; Jennings 1987).  For 
example, a disclosure that deviates significantly from investors’ expectations will be less 
credible than one that does not.  I suggest that voluntarily disclosing ICWs is more 
credible because investors are more likely to believe that IPO registrants’ financial 
reporting issues include internal control problems.  
 Studies that apply persuasion models to financial disclosures suggest that 
situational incentives influence disclosure credibility (Hutton et al. 2003; Williams 1996; 
McNichols 1989; Hassell et al. 1988). In the IPO context, IPO management has greater 
incentives to provide good news rather than bad news disclosures.  However, bad news 
disclosures are expected to be more credible than good news disclosures (Mercer 2004). 
Voluntarily disclosing ICWs in their registration statement is arguably a bad news 
disclosure and thus, may improve investors’ perception that management is credible and 
not misleading investors.   
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 Anecdotal evidence suggests that auditors and underwriters expect IPO registrants 
to complete SOX 404 readiness assessments before pricing the IPO.  Upon completion of 
the SOX 404 readiness assessment, auditors and underwriters are likely to encourage 
registrants to disclose any identified weaknesses to increase the transparency of the 
registrants’ control environment and convey to the public that they are aware of the 
financial reporting areas needing improvement. Thus, I expect IPO management is more 
likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in IPO registration statements to increase disclosure 
credibility.  I formally state H1, in the alternative form, as follows: 
H1: IPO registrants disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration statements 
to increase management’s disclosure credibility. 
2.4 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO Offer Prices 
Prior IPO studies have primarily examined the underpricing phenomenon; 
however, a few studies address the initial pricing of IPOs.  Early pricing studies 
investigated the association between financial information in the registration statement 
and IPO offer prices (Klein 1996; Purnanandam and Swaminathan 2004; Beatty, Riffe, 
and Thompson 2000; Loughran and Ritter 2004).  Their findings suggest a positive 
association between IPO offer prices and earnings per share, pro forma book value of 
equity, the amount of equity retained by previous shareholders, the size of the 
underwriting firm, auditor reputation, the net proceeds of the offering, the registrants’ 
age, and whether the offering consists of only stock.   
Prior accounting research investigating information asymmetry and its related 
effect on company valuations suggests an association between lower information 
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asymmetry and higher valuations. Easley and O’Hara (2004) examine the discrepancies 
between public information and private information and suggest that less informed 
traders hold fewer assets because they realize they are disadvantaged.  Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) claim greater disclosure reduces the adverse price impact of large 
trades, which, in an IPO registration setting, leads to increased demand and a higher IPO 
valuation. Therefore, in this study’s context, investors who encounter less information 
asymmetry should expect to pay more for the IPO.  Thus, voluntarily disclosing ICWs 
may increase IPO valuations by reducing information asymmetry in the IPO registration 
process.   
On the other hand, Roosenboom (2007) examines how underwriters value initial 
public offerings and finds that underwriters consider discounted cash flow and dividend 
discount models in the valuation process.  His findings suggest that underwriters discount 
IPO offer prices less when the registrants are forecasted to be relatively profitable in the 
year of going public.  IPO discounts are higher with increased risk and valuation 
uncertainty.  Voluntary ICW disclosures may signal increased risk, valuation uncertainty, 
and affect profitability for more pervasive control problems often categorized as material 
weaknesses.  Thus, voluntarily disclosing ICWs may decrease IPO valuations because the 
disclosed information signals potential negative consequences associated with cash flows 
and profitability.   
I suggest that IPO registrants have an incentive to disclose ICWs voluntarily to 
improve disclosure credibility with underwriters.  Underwriters certify that the IPO 
offering price reflects both public and private information about the registrant. 
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Underwriters risk reputation capital if they price offerings inappropriately, or market 
participants subsequently conclude that the IPO registrant provided misleading 
information (Beatty and Ritter 1986; Booth and Smith 1986; Menon and Williams 1991). 
Because SOX does not require internal control reports for registrants, registrants 
remaining silent regarding internal controls likely have greater information asymmetry 
than registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs; increasing the likelihood that registrants 
without internal control over financial reporting disclosures could be considered 
mispriced.  However, those ICWs voluntarily disclosed, especially those involving 
material weaknesses, may reveal bad news associated with future profitability and cash 
flows likely increasing the registrants’ risk profile with the underwriter.  Given 
competing arguments about the association between IPO offer prices and voluntary ICW 
disclosures, I state H2, in the null form, as follows: 
H2: There is no association between registrants’ voluntary ICWs disclosures and 
IPO offer price. 
2.5 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material Weaknesses 
Prior research after the passage of SOX 404 suggests public companies that 
disclose ICWs prior to mandated internal control audits (e.g., in Form 8-K, SOX Section 
302 certification) tend to be smaller, younger, financially weaker, more complex, 
resource constrained, and have more auditor turnovers (Krishnan 2005; Doyle, Ge, 
McVay 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007).  Several studies present evidence that 
companies are less likely to remediate ICWs because of resource constraints (Doyle et al. 
2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Johnstone, Li, and Rupley 2011; Goh 2009; Chan, 
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Kleinman, and Li 2009; Hammersley, Myers, and Zhou 2012).  As IPO registrants 
transition from going public to being public, the majority can be classified as resource 
constrained. In a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey, 78% of survey respondents indicated 
they hired between 1-5 new staff, to increase their SEC reporting capabilities 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2015).4  The PricewaterhouseCoopers survey results provide 
evidence that after the IPO, registrants do not have adequate resources to meet SEC 
reporting demands.  Thus, based on prior studies and survey responses it is likely that a 
positive association between voluntary disclosure of ICWs and post-IPO material 
weaknesses exists. 
 Companies with significant financial reporting challenges are fruitful for internal 
control weakness research (Scheider, Gramling, Hermanson, and Ye 2009).  Prior 
research provides evidence that companies failing to remediate material weaknesses have 
an increased likelihood experiencing higher audit fees, receiving modified audit opinions 
and going concern opinions, and more frequent auditor changes (Hammersley et al. 
2012).  Research examining material weaknesses and earnings quality suggests a positive 
association between companies that invest in remediating material weaknesses and higher 
earnings quality. Using the IPO setting is informative about whether voluntarily 
disclosing deficient internal controls is an early warning of lower post-IPO financial 
reporting quality because of the lack of resources (e.g., people and/or systems) often 
required to fix control problems.  I formally state H3, in the alternative form, as follows: 
                                                 
4 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP collaborated with Oxford Economics on a survey conducted from 
September to December 2014 for US IPOs since 2012 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2015). 
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H3: Voluntary ICW disclosures are associated with a higher likelihood of post-
IPO SOX 404 material weaknesses.   
2.6 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Market Reaction to Subsequent SOX 404 
Material Weaknesses  
 Voluntarily disclosing ICWs in IPO registration statements potentially builds trust 
between management and investors because the voluntary disclosure signals that 
management is willing to accept a greater level of external monitoring.  The majority of 
research on voluntary disclosure of ICWs establishes an association between SOX 302 
material weakness disclosures and a higher cost of equity capital (Cassell, Myers, Zhou 
2013; Kim and Park 2009; Beneish et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney 
2009).  These studies focus on companies that have less uncertainty about their financial 
reporting credibility because the majority of companies were releasing audited financial 
statements publicly before SOX.  This study extends the prior literature by including IPO 
registrants’ voluntary disclosure of ICWs before required compliance with SOX 302 or 
SOX 404.  Examining voluntary disclosure of ICWs in this setting is particularly 
informative because there is no requirement for internal control opinions for IPO 
registrants’ as of the registration date. (Beatty 1989; Menon and Williams 1991; 
Willenborg 1999).   
 IPO management can choose to disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement to 
reduce uncertainty.  Prior research indicates that investors are uncertain about 
management’s private information and thus they cannot infer from silence that 
management is withholding negative news (Dye 1985).  However, bad news will be 
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disclosed when the costs of disclosure are low enough or when the uncertainty is high 
because reducing that uncertainty should benefit the IPO registrant.  Managers also incur 
reputational costs if they fail to disclose negative news promptly (Skinner 1997, 1994).  I 
suggest there is an association between voluntarily disclosing ICWs and management’s 
attempts to increase their disclosure credibility.  Thus, IPO management alerts the 
financial markets of their ICWs upon identification rather than incurring the costs of 
remaining silent until required compliance. 
The post-IPO negative event I examine is the identification of SOX 404 material 
weaknesses in the first post-IPO SOX 404 auditor opinion.  Given that companies are 
more likely to disclose voluntarily when the disclosure benefits exceed the costs, 
investors may not react to registrants disclosing SOX 404 material weaknesses in their 
first post-IPO SOX 404 auditor opinion because investors perceive management as more 
credible for voluntarily disclosing ICWs in their IPO registration statements.  Thus, 
management reduces future investor punishment by establishing credibility before the 
bad news was released.  I formally state H4, in the null form, as follows: 
H4: There is no association between voluntary ICW disclosures and a subsequent 
market response to negative events. 
2.7 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent Misstatements  
 Prior literature suggests that companies with reported ICWs are more likely to 
have subsequent misstatements (Li and Wang 2006; Nagy 2010; Feng and Li 2010).  Li 
and Wang (2006) find that subsequent misstatements from companies receiving adverse 
internal control over financial reporting opinions have larger net income effects and 
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involve more financial statement accounts. Nagy (2010) provides evidence that 
companies disclosing an internal control material weakness in the previous period are 
more likely to misstate financial statements in the current period.  Feng and Li (2010) 
suggest SOX 404 enables companies to prevent and detect material misstatements in 
financial reports in a more timely manner. Additionally, ICWs in specific accounts are 
positively associated with misstatements in those accounts (Feng and Li 2010).   
 However, the reliability of SOX 404 reports has been questioned, and the 
effectiveness of SOX 404 in providing a warning of potential accounting problems 
remains unclear. For example, the SEC has suggested that the recent decline in reported 
control weaknesses “could be due to material weaknesses not being identified or 
reported,” as opposed to improvements in the underlying controls (SEC 2009; 
Whitehouse 2009, 2010, 2015; Rice, Weber, Wu 2014). Practitioners are also concerned 
about the robustness of enforcement, noting that the SEC eliminated its accounting fraud 
task force in a recent reorganization (e.g., McKenna 2012).5 
Recent evidence from academic research highlights similar concerns. Rice and 
Weber (2012) study a sample of companies with misstatements stemming from 
underlying ICWs and find that the majority of these companies do not report their 
weaknesses before the related misstatements. Thus, in many cases, financial statement 
users are not provided an early warning of the possibility of a material misstatement in 
the financial statements until after the announcement of such a misstatement. 
                                                 
5 For example, Jack Ciesielski, owner of research firm R.G. Associates and publisher of The Analyst’s 
Accounting Observer, is quoted in McKenna (2012, 46) arguing, “SEC enforcement of Sarbanes -Oxley has 
been minimal. Sarbanes-Oxley may have brought us some peace for our time, but without vigilance 
through long-term enforcement, it can’t last.” 
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Additionally, restatements have outpaced reported ICWs in recent years implying that 
many weaknesses likely go unreported (Plumlee and Yohn 2010). 
2.8 Audit Quality Link to Financial Reporting Quality 
 The unresolved question of why financial statement restatements outpace reported 
material weaknesses is an intense focus of regulators today.  The entire objective of 
internal control reporting under SOX 404 remains unachieved after a post-enactment 
decade.6  As a result, regulators are seeking changes in guidance and standards.  For 
example, the PCAOB recently unveiled a Concept Release on Audit Quality Indicators 
and it includes financial statement restatements as an indicator (Hanson 2015).  A survey 
of audit partners and investors also confirms that financial statement restatements for 
errors are a leading indicator of audit quality linked to financial reporting quality 
(Christensen, Glover, Omer, and Shelley 2015).   
 Regulators and academics agree that audit quality includes many dimensions such 
as inputs, processes, outputs and opinions, and post-opinion (Francis 2011; Bedard et al. 
2010; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Knechel et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2015).  I suggest 
that voluntarily disclosed ICWs in an IPO registration statement becomes an audit risk 
that auditors should consider when performing subsequent audits.  Thus, voluntarily 
disclosed ICWs in an IPO registration statement should be part of subsequent audit 
processes (e.g., implementation of audit tests by engagement teams) (Francis 2011).  This 
study offers a rare setting for examining the subsequent audit processes for IPO 
                                                 
6 ”The whole point was to provide information in advance of any financial restatement,” says Joe Carcello, 
executive director of the corporate governance center at the University of Tennessee. “If investors never get 
information in advance, it’s not exactly clear what the point of it is.” (W hitehouse 2015). 
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registrants.  Using subsequent misstatements for IPO registrants completes the audit 
quality analysis.  This dataset allows one to gain further insight into audit quality because 
material weaknesses and misstatements are available for the entire tenure of IPO 
registrants.   
 This study is relevant to those regulators and academics’ concerns that companies 
are not disclosing internal control material weaknesses.  From 2010-2014, the percentage 
of clean internal control opinions preceding financial statement restatements rose from 
74.2% in 2010 to 80.4% in 2014 (Whitehouse 2015).7  Anecdotal evidence supports the 
notion that it is difficult for auditors to convince an audit client that a material weakness 
exists in the absence of a material misstatement (Franzel 2015).  Thus, financial reporting 
quality, measured by financial statement misstatements, appears to relate to the output 
dimension of audit quality.  I formally state H5, in the null form, as follows: 
H5: Voluntary ICW disclosures are not associated with the likelihood of post-IPO 
misstatements. 
CHAPTER 3. MEASURES AND MODELS 
3.1 Management’s Disclosure Credibility Measures  
CEOs are often the central strategic decision maker and are assumed to have the 
greatest influence over discretionary choices (Barker and Mueller 2002).  I suggest that 
new CEOs at the time of the IPO are more likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures to 
increase their disclosure credibility.  On the other hand, prior research indicates long-
                                                 
7 “There are a lot of analytics there to suggest that companies are not discussing or acknowledging 
weaknesses, but instead are relying on the fact that there are no material misstatements, so therefore 
controls are fine,” says Pat Voll, vice president at financial reporting consulting firm RoseRyan. “That’s 
not an appropriate conclusion.” (Whitehouse 2015). 
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tenured CEOs lose touch with their firms’ environments and may not make changes to 
improve the company over time (Miller 1991).  Other studies suggest that founder/long-
tenured CEOs are more likely concerned with ownership dilution and control issues than 
financial reporting problems (Jain and Tabak 2008). Thus, long-tenured CEOs may not 
voluntarily disclose ICWs because they are not concerned about improving financial 
reporting.  On the other hand, new CEOs likely have greater incentives to improve their 
disclosure credibility to establish their knowledge of company problems with financial 
reporting.   
 CEO age is also likely associated with the incentive to establish disclosure 
credibility (Kim, Bateman, Gilbreath, and Andersson 2009).  Older CEOs tend to be 
more conservative and risk averse (Barker and Mueller 2002; Hambrick and Mason 
1984).  I suggest that conservatism and risk aversion increase the likelihood that older 
CEOs will disclose ICWs voluntarily.  The Securities Act of 1993 Section 11 provides 
some of that incentive because it allows investors to initiate lawsuits against registrants, 
underwriters, or auditors when the stock price is below the offer price because of 
omissions of material information in the registration statement.  Thus, older CEOs are 
more likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures to reduce personal risks associated with 
the IPO registration. 
3.2 Voluntary ICW Disclosure Incentives 
To test H1, I estimate a logistic model to examine the association between 
voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements and incentives to increase 
disclosure.  The logit model is as follows: 
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ICW_REGISTRANT = β0 + β1NEWCEO + β2CEOAGE + β3LN_MV + β4LIT + 
β5LN_TA + β6BIGN + β7LN_AGE + β8VC_BACKED + β9PE_BACKED + 
β10CARVEOUT + β11NASDAQ + β12GC + β13REST_REGISTRANT + 
β14LN_BUSSEG + β15FOREIGN + β16GDWLIP + β17WDP + β18AUDITOR_CHG + 
ε    (1) 
 
where ICW_REGISTRANT, the dependent variable in equation (1), is an indicator 
variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any 
deficient internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or control 
deficiency) in its registration statement.   
My variables of interest are NEWCEO and CEOAGE. The NEWCEO and 
CEOAGE are proxies for management credibility.  NEWCEO is an indicator variable 
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the CEO tenure at the IPO date is zero years, and I 
expect a positive coefficient for NEWCEO. Prior studies suggest that founder CEOs tend 
to be more concerned about ownership dilution and control issues than financial reporting 
issues in IPO transactions which likely reduces their credibility (Jain and Tabek 2008).  
Thus, companies typically hire new CEOs in IPO transactions (Bruton, Fried, and Hisrich 
1997; Bruton, Fried, and Hisrich 2000; Fried and Hisrich 1995; Jain and Tabek 2008).  
CEOAGE is the CEO’s age at the IPO date.  Prior research suggests age is correlated 
with top management credibility (Kim et al. 2009). I expect a positive coefficient because 
prior research suggests older CEOs are more conservative and risk-averse (Bantel and 
Jackson 1989; Barker and Mueller 2002; Child 1974; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Joos, 
Leone, and Zimmerman 2003; Jain and Tabek 2008).  Thus, older CEOs are more likely 
to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements. 
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The LN_MV and LIT are proxies for litigation risk.  LN_MV is the logarithmic 
transformation of the pre-IPO market value of equity.  Venkataraman, Weber, and 
Willenborg (2008) suggest higher proceeds indicate greater risk exposure, and I expect a 
positive coefficient.  Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007), LIT is an indicator 
variable that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant is in a high litigation risk 
industry.  I define high litigation risk industries following Venkataraman et al. (2008), 
and I expect a positive coefficient.   
The control variables include other registrant characteristics likely associated with 
the disclosure of ICWs. LN_TA is measured using the logarithmic transformation of total 
assets.  I expect a negative coefficient on because larger companies are more likely to 
have more financial reporting processes and procedures in place. Larger companies are 
also more likely to have an adequate number of employees to ensure proper segregation 
of duties (Czerney 2015; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Krishnan 2005). 
LN_AGE is the logarithmic transformation of the registrant age.  A negative coefficient 
is expected based on the notion that older IPO registrants have stronger internal controls 
(Doyle et al. 2007).  Registrants with pre-tax goodwill impairments (GDWLIP) and other 
pre-tax write-downs (WDP) are more likely to have internal control weaknesses (Doyle et 
al. 2007).  Thus, I expect positive coefficients on GDWLIP and WDP.  To control 
registrants’ complexity, I include the following controls: the logarithmic transformation 
of the total number of business segments (LN_BUSSEG) and a foreign operations 
indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant has foreign operations 
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(FOREIGN).  I expect a positive coefficient for both complexity proxies (Goh 2009; Rice 
and Weber 2012).   
The IPO registrants’ auditors and other capital providers are likely to have 
incentives to encourage the registrant to disclose ICWs noted in the IPO registration 
statement process.  Prior research suggests external auditors, especially Big 4 auditors, 
have strong incentives to avoid potential litigation and reputational loss (Beatty 1989; 
Beatty and Welch 1996; Hogan 1997; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Lou and Vasvari 
2013).  I include an indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant has a Big 
N auditor and expect a positive coefficient for BIGN because IPO registrants may be 
pressured to disclose ICWs identified by their external auditor.  I include an indicator 
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant has changed auditors since the prior 
audited financial statement date and expect a positive coefficient for AUDITOR_CHG 
because IPO registrants with recent auditor changes are more likely to report ICWs 
(Hermanson, Krishnan, and Ye 2009; Rice and Weber 2012).  Venture capitalists are also 
closely involved in IPO registration statement process and monitor the IPO registrants 
they have backed (Gompers and Lerner 2004). Thus, I include an indicator equal to one 
(and zero otherwise) if a registrant has venture capital backing and expect a positive 
coefficient for VC_BACKED.  Private equity firms take an active role in monitoring the 
IPO registrants that they supply capital (Gompers and Lerner 2000).  PE_BACKED is an 
indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant has private equity backing.  I 
expect a positive coefficient for PE_BACKED.  A sponsored spin-off is a company 
carved out of an established organization and often the former parent will retain partial 
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ownership in the new registrant (Wallin and Dahlstrand 2006). I suggest the partial 
ownership interests generate additional monitoring of the IPO registrant.  Thus, I include 
CARVEOUT an indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant is a spinoff 
from another public company. I expect a positive coefficient.   
Willenborg and McKeown (2001) report that many registrants issue shares to the 
public despite having received going-concern opinions from their auditors. Registrants 
with going-concern issues are likely subject to higher litigation risk and, therefore, are 
more likely to disclose ICWs. I include GC an indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise) 
if the registrant received a going concern audit opinion in the IPO registration statement 
to control for the differences between registrants with and without going-concern issues.  
Additionally, I include an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant lists on the NASDAQ exchange, NASDAQ.  Another indication of ineffective 
financial reporting is the occurrence of accounting restatements (Kinney and McDaniel 
1989; PCAOB 2007).  Thus, I include REST_REGISTRANT an indicator equal to one 
(and zero otherwise) if the registrant restated financial statements in the IPO registration 
statement.  I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels after 
merging data, calculating lag values, and scaling variables. Appendix B provides a 
summary of all variables. 
3.3 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO Offer Prices 
I examine the association between registrants’ IPO offer prices and voluntary 
ICWs disclosures to test H2. To test the relation, I use the following OLS model: 
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LN_IPO_PRICE = β0 + β1ICW + β2EPS + β3BV + β4NET_PROCEEDS + 
β5UW_SHARE + β6BIGN + β7LN_AGE + β8LIT + β9NEWCEO + β10CEOAGE 
+ YearFE + ε   (2) 
 
where LN_IPO_PRICE, the dependent variable in equation (2), is the logarithmic 
transformation of the IPO offer price. I choose the IPO offer price because I investigate 
whether voluntary ICWs disclosures in the IPO registration statement builds credibility 
with underwriters, who determine the IPO offer price. The variables of interest ICW is 
one of the four following ICW disclosure measures: ICW_REGISTRANT, MW_ONLY, 
SD_ONLY, and CD_ONLY.  ICW_REGISTRANT is an indicator variable equal to one 
(and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls 
(material weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration 
statement.  MW_ONLY is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant voluntarily disclosed, at least, one material weakness in its registration 
statement.  SD_ONLY is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant voluntarily disclosed, at least, one significant deficiency in its registration 
statement.  CD_ONLY is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant voluntarily disclosed, at least, one control deficiency in its registration 
statement.   
 The prior literature suggests positive associations between profitability and the 
book value of equity provided in IPO registrants’ prospectuses and IPO pricing (Klein 
1996; Beatty et al. 2000).  Thus, I include control variables for registrants’ pre-offering 
earnings per share (EPS) and pre-offering book value of equity (BV).  Prior research 
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suggests a positive association between the proportion of proceeds retained by the issuer 
and IPO pricing (Beatty et al. 2000); therefore, I include NET_PROCEEDS in the model.   
Prior research also suggests a positive association between the proportion of 
underwriters’ market share of IPO proceeds underwritten and IPO pricing (Beatty et al. 
2000); therefore, I include the control variable UW_SHARE.  Additionally, I control for 
BIGN and LN_ AGE because prior research suggests that IPO offer prices are associated 
with information in the prospectus and risk (Klein 1996; Beatty et al. 2000; Menon and 
Williams 1991; Loughran and Ritter 2004; Beatty and Ritter 1986). Prior research 
suggests operating in high litigation industries is associated with lower IPO offer prices 
(Klein 1996); therefore, I expect a negative coefficient for LIT.  I do not predict a sign on 
the coefficient for NEWCEO or CEOAGE because it is not clear whether CEO attributes 
affect IPO pricing.  Year fixed effects are included to control for cross-sectional variation 
in IPO offer prices over the sample period.  I again winsorize all additional continuous 
variables at the 1 percent, and 99 percent levels after merging data, calculating lag values, 
and scaling variables. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables. 
3.4 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material Weaknesses 
To test H3, I use a Firth logistic model to estimate an increased likelihood of 
auditor-reported material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting when 
IPO registrants voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements (Firth 
1993).  The logistic model is as follows: 
ICW_404 = β0 + β1ICW_ REGISTRANT + β2LN_TA + β3LACK_RESOURCES + 
β4LN_BUSSEG + β5LOSS + β6CR + β7INVREC + β8Z + β9BIGN + β10DIFF_AUD + 
β11LN_AGE + β12AU9550 + β13FOREIGN + β14REST_REGISTRANT + 
β14LN_FEES + β16NAS + YearFE + IndustryFE + ε  (3)  
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where ICW_404, the dependent variable in equation (3), is an indicator variable equal to 
one (and zero otherwise) if the company’s auditor provides an adverse opinion in their 
first SOX 404 report. The variable of interest is ICW_REGISTRANT, an indicator 
variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any 
deficient internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or control 
deficiency) in its registration statement.   
Prior research suggests that determinants of ICW disclosures and subsequent 
remediation are registrant size, resource constraints, complexity, and financial distress 
(Bedard et al. 2012; Hammersley et al. 2012; Johnstone et al. 2011; Goh 2009; Chan et 
al. 2009; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Krishnan 2005). Registrant size 
is measured using the logarithmic transformation of total assets LN_TA, and a negative 
coefficient is expected on LN_TA based on prior research (Czerney 2015; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Krishnan 2005). I include an indicator variable 
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant discloses an ICW in its IPO registration 
statement related to insufficient personnel with the appropriate level of knowledge, 
experience, and training, LACK_RESOURCES.  I do not predict a sign for the 
coefficient.  An additional measure of resource constraints is the age of the IPO 
registrant, proxied by LN_AGE.  A negative coefficient is expected based on the notion 
that longer-tenured IPO registrants have stronger internal controls (Doyle et al. 2007).  
The proxies for registrant complexity are the logarithmic transformation of the total 
number of business segments LN_BUSSEG, a foreign operations indicator FOREIGN, 
and an indicator for restated financial statements in the IPO registration statement 
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REST_REGISTRANT. Following prior research, I expect positive coefficients for all 
three complexity measures (Johnstone et al. 2011; Goh 2009; Rice and Weber 2012).  
Financial health is measured using an indicator variable that equals one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant reports a net loss LOSS, the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities CR, the ratio of the sum of inventory and receivables to total assets INVREC, 
and the Altman (2000) financial distress measure Z.  Prior research supports expecting a 
negative coefficient for CR and Z and a positive coefficient for LOSS and INVREC 
(Czerney 2015; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007). 
I include controls for the auditor’s ability to identify and issue an adverse internal 
control over financial reporting opinion. BIGN equals one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant has a Big N auditor.  DIFF_AUD is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the auditor changed since the IPO.  Following prior research, I expect a 
positive coefficient on the auditor change measure (Czerney 2015; Rice and Weber 
2012).  Auditors are not required to opine on internal controls in IPO registration 
statements.  However, some auditor opinions include an explanatory paragraph stating 
that the auditor was not engaged to audit internal control over financial reporting, and 
accordingly does not express an opinion.  Therefore, an indicator equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant whose IPO audit report included in the IPO registration 
contains non-standard language in accordance with AU Section 9550 that states the 
auditor’s opinion does not include an opinion on the effectiveness of internal control over 
financial reporting (AU9550) is included as a control. I expect a positive coefficient 
(Czerney 2015).  To control for any potential economic bonding and auditor effort, I 
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include controls for the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (NAS) and the logarithmic 
transformation of the total audit fees LN_FEES.  The coefficients on NAS and LNFEES 
are expected to be negative and positive, respectively (Czerney 2015; Rice and Weber 
2012).   
The model includes year and industry fixed effects to control for cross-sectional 
variation in material weaknesses reported over time and across industries.  All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1 percent, and 99 percent levels after merging data, 
calculating lag values, and scaling variables. Appendix B provides a summary of all 
variables. 
3.5 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Market Reaction to Subsequent SOX 404 
Material Weaknesses   
To test H4, I examine differential investor response to the release of the first SOX 
404 auditor opinion after the IPO. I consider cumulative abnormal returns to earnings 
announcements using the following OLS model, modified from Kim and Park (2009): 
CAR (-1, 1) = β0 + β1VICW_CLEAN + β2SILENT_ADVERSE + 
β3VICW_ADVERSE + β4LN_TA + β5BM + β6ACCEL + β7LEV + β8BHR 
+β9BIGN + β10LN_GEOSEG + + β11FOREIGN + β12SALES_GROWTH + 
β13INVT + β14LOSS +β15LN_AGE + β16UE + β17DIFF_AUD + YearFE + 
IndustryFE + ε (4)  
 
where CAR (-1,1), the dependent variable in equation (4), is the market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal return (equally weighted index) over days minus 1 and 1, where day 
0 is the filing date of the second annual report including the first internal control over 
financial reporting opinion.  The variables of interest are VICW_CLEAN, 
SILENT_ADVERSE, and VICW_ADVERSE. VICW_CLEAN is an indicator variable 
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equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient 
internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its 
registration statement and received an unqualified SOX 404 audit opinion in its second 
annual report.  SILENT_ADVERSE is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant did not voluntarily disclose any deficient internal controls in 
its registration statement and received an adverse SOX 404 audit opinion in its second 
annual report.  VICW_ADVERSE is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls in its 
registration statement and received an adverse SOX 404 audit opinion in its second 
annual report.    
Following Kim and Park (2009), I control for the book value of equity to market 
value of equity ratio, BM.  ACCEL is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant is an accelerated filer (market value of equity > $75 million).  
Registrants with ICWs tend to be less profitable, smaller, younger, more complex, or 
growing rapidly (e.g., Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 
2007). Accordingly, I include an indicator for companies that report a net loss LOSS and 
the ratio of total debt to assets LEV to control for profitability.  I include the logarithmic 
transformation of total assets LN_TA to control for company size.  Additionally, I 
include the logarithmic transformation of the company’s age LN_AGE.  I include the 
logarithmic transformation of the total number of geographic segments LN_GEOSEG 
and a foreign operations indicator FOREIGN to control for complexity.  I include an 
indicator variable that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the registrants’ sales growth is 
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in the top quintile SALES_GROWTH and the ratio of inventory to total assets INVT to 
control for growth.   
I include a BIGN indicator to control for auditors’ ability to identify an adverse 
internal control over financial reporting opinion.  I include the variables BHR and UE to 
control for information released contemporaneously with SOX 404 auditor opinions.  
BHR is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the buy-and-hold 
market adjusted return over the 120 days before the SOX 404 auditor opinion (i.e., from 
day -120 to -1) is less than zero.  Unexpected earnings UE is calculated as reported IBES 
earnings minus the median consensus analyst EPS forecast, deflated by stock price.  
DIFF_AUD is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the auditor 
changed since the IPO.  I make no prediction for BM, LN_GEOSEG, FOREIGN, 
SALES_GROWTH, LOSS, LEV, INVT, BHR, UE, and DIFF_AUD.  The model 
includes year and industry fixed effects to control for cross-sectional variation in material 
weaknesses reported over time and across industries.  I winsorize all continuous variables 
at the 1 percent, and 99 percent levels after merging data, calculating lag values, and 
scaling variables. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables. 
3.6 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent Misstatements  
To test H5, I estimate a logistic model to examine whether registrants’ post-IPO 
financial reporting quality is associated with voluntarily disclosed ICWs in the IPO 
registration statement.  The logistic model is as follows: 
DRFQ = β0 + β1LN_TA + β2LN_BUSSEG + β3NEG_ROA + β4CR + β5INVREC + 
β6Z + β7BIGN + β8AUDITOR_CHG + β9LIT + β10AU9550 + β11LN_AGE + 
β12FOREIGN + β13AS5_404 + β14BODSIZE + β15DUALCEO +β16NAS + ε  (5)  
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where DRFQ, the dependent variable in equation (5), is categorical and has four different 
groups. The base group is registrants that report no indicators of degrading financial 
reporting quality (i.e., no ICWs or misstatements). Thus, the base group is registrants that 
do not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement, have an unqualified 
internal control opinion, and report no post-IPO misstatements.  The VICW group is 
registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement, have an 
unqualified internal control opinion, and do not have a corresponding misstatement for 
the year mentioned in the internal control over financial reporting opinion.  The 
VICW_REST group is registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration 
statement, have an unqualified internal control opinion, and have a corresponding 
misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial reporting 
opinion.  The REST group is registrants that do not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO 
registration statement, have an unqualified internal control opinion, and have a 
corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial 
reporting opinion.  Table 1 summarizes the groups. 8 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
Prior literature indicates that registrant characteristics may influence the 
likelihood of ICW disclosures and subsequent misstatements.  LN_TA controls for 
                                                 
8 IPO registrants that did report internal control deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404 are removed from 
the sample because those outcome groups have inadequate cell counts (Garson 2012). Fifteen observations 
reported internal control deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404 only.  Nineteen observations reported 
internal control deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404 and misstated their financial statements. Fifteen 
observations voluntarily disclosed internal control deficiencies in their IPO registration statements and 
reported internal control deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404.  Eighteen observations voluntarily 
disclosed internal control deficiencies in their IPO registration statements, reported internal control 
deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404, and misstated their financial statements. 
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registrant size and is measured using the logarithmic transformation of total assets.  A 
prediction is not made for the LN_TA coefficient because prior research provides mixed 
results on the association between company size and misstatements (Cao, Myers, Omer 
2012). I include two proxies for registrant complexity; the logarithmic transformation of 
the total number of business segments (LN_BUSSEG) and a foreign operations indicator 
(FOREIGN).  Evidence from prior studies supports companies’ complexity being 
negatively associated with financial reporting quality (Ge and McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 
2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Goh 2009; Johnstone et al. 2011; Rice and Weber 
2012).  Following prior studies, I expect positive coefficients for both complexity 
measures.  I include four financial health proxies.  The proxies are an indicator variable 
that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant reports a negative return on assets 
NEG_ROA, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities CR, the ratio of the sum of 
inventory and receivables to total assets INVREC, and the Altman (2000) financial 
distress measure Z.  Prior research predicts negative coefficients for CR and Z and 
positive coefficients for NEG_ROA and INVREC (Czerney 2015; Cao et al. 2012; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Summers and Sweeney 1998).  Prior 
literature finds a negative association between misstatements and company age, 
suggesting younger companies have less mature financial reporting structures (Doyle et 
al. 2007). Thus, the logarithmic transformation of a company’s age, LN_AGE, is 
included, and a negative coefficient is expected.   
I include indicators for BIGN, AUDITOR_CHG, AU9550, and AS5_404 to 
control for the auditors’ characteristics. I expect a negative coefficient for BIGN and a 
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positive coefficient for AUDITOR_CHG (Rice and Weber 2012).  AU9550 controls for 
an IPO registration statement’s auditor opinion with non-standard language in accordance 
with AU Section 9550. In this context, the auditor’s opinion does not include an opinion 
on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.  AS5_404 controls for 
having an auditor opinion issued after the passage of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS 5). I 
do not predict signs for the coefficients AU9550 or AS5_404.  I also include the ratio of 
non-audit fees to total fees (NAS) to control for the association between financial 
reporting quality and non-audit fees.  The extant evidence is largely mixed, thus, I do not 
predict a sign for the coefficient on NAS (Cao et al. 2012; Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz 
2004; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Maydew 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Frankel, 
Johnson, and Nelson 2002).   
I control for total number of members on the board of directors (BODSIZE) and 
for CEOs who are the board chair (DUALCEO) because these two basic board 
characteristics are commonly used to proxy for the strength of corporate governance.  
Consistent with prior literature, I expect positive coefficients for BODSIZE and 
DUALCEO (Cao et al. 2012; Yermack 1996; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996).  
Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007), I control for heightened litigation risk 
using an indicator variable that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant is in a 
high litigation risk industry LIT.  I define high litigation risk industries consistent with 
Venkataraman et al. (2008) and I predict a sign on the coefficient.  I winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1 percent, and 99 percent levels after merging data, 
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calculating lag values, and scaling variables. Appendix B provides a summary of all 
variables. 
3.7 Sample 
I obtain a sample of IPO registrants from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2013, 
and use data from the Audit Analytics, BoardEx, and Compustat databases and 
supplemental manual screening of the IPO registration statements. The sample period 
begins on January 1, 2005, because all public companies, regardless of market 
capitalization, were required to comply with SOX 404 during 2005. The sample period 
ends on December 31, 2013, because this is the latest data available.  The sample 
includes registrants that originally file their registration statement with the SEC on form 
S-1 or F-1.  To identify registrants that voluntarily disclosed ICWs and included restated 
financial statements within their IPO registration statements, I manually screen the risk 
factors, management’s discussion and analysis, and audited financial statements sections 
of IPO registration statements.  Refer to Appendix A for examples of voluntary ICW 
disclosures from IPO companies in this sample.  Consistent with prior IPO research, unit 
offerings, closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts, and American depository 
receipts are excluded.  I begin with an available sample of 1,215 IPO registrants for my 
multivariate analyses.  The sample I use to examine H1 is 608 registrants because 188 
registrants do not have the necessary Compustat data and 419 registrants do not have 
CEO data in BoardEx. I use a sample of 590 registrants to examine H2; I eliminate 18 
registrants from the sample used to test H1 because they do not have the data necessary in 
Compustat to test H2.  The sample I use to examine H3 is 785 registrants because 111 
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registrants do not have the necessary Compustat data and 73 registrants lack the 
necessary Audit Analytics data.  The sample size used to test H4 is 517 registrants 
because 113 registrants lack the necessary Audit Analytics data, 159 registrants lack the 
necessary data to compute cumulative abnormal returns, 242 registrants lack the 
necessary IBES data, seven registrants lack the necessary Compustat data, and four 
registrants disclose different ICWs in their IPO and adverse SOX 404 auditor opinions.  I 
delete the registrants that disclose different ICWs in their IPO and adverse SOX 404 
auditor opinions because I want to determine if the market reactions are related to 
persistent ICWs.  I use a sample of 635 registrants to test H5 because 181 registrants lack 
the necessary Compustat data, 324 registrants had subsequent misstatements more than 
three years after the IPO, 67 registrants had SOX 404 material weaknesses related to the 
same year of the misstatement, and 100 registrants lack the necessary BoardEx data.  I 
delete misstatements if they affect periods that begin more than three years after the IPO 
because the Securities Act of 1933 litigation window expires three years after the IPO 
date. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
3.8 Entropy Balancing Adjustment 
 I use entropy balancing to create a balanced sample of IPO registrants that 
voluntarily disclosed ICWs and those that did not.  Unlike matching based on propensity 
scores, entropy balancing directly calculates weights to adjust for known sample 
distributions, integrating covariate balance directly into the weights assigned to control 
observations (Hainmueller 2012; Hainmueller and Xu 2013). Entropy balancing employs 
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a maximum-entropy reweighting scheme to create a set of weights such that the treatment 
and reweighted control samples satisfy constraints that balance the three moments of the 
distribution of treatment firms with control firms on a large set of covariates. The 
improved balance in covariate distributions and maximum retention of sample size, in 
particular, treatment firms are the method’s principal advantages. Balance is assessed 
individually or jointly on mean, variance, and skewness of selected covariates and the 
procedure can be set to iterate repeatedly until the variance of the weights cannot be 
reduced further without undermining the balance constraints.  
Application of the entropy balance weights to the control sample results in more 
weight being given to under-represented groups and less weight to over-represented 
groups, adjusting for unequal probability of sample selection and creates a “pseudo-
population” with characteristics in line with the treatment sample. I use an entropy-
balanced sample adjusted for differences in the first moment (mean) of the covariate 
distributions to examine H2 because the model does not converge when balancing on the 
second and third moments.  I use an entropy-balanced sample adjusted for differences in 
the first (mean) and second (variance) moments of the covariate distributions to examine 
H4 because the model does not converge when balancing on the third moment. 
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample population.  Table 3 Panel A 
identifies the distribution of the sample by industry (17 Fama-French industry 
classification) (Fama and French 1997) to test the five hypotheses. The largest industry 
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group is Other in the samples to test each of the five hypotheses. Table 3 Panel B presents 
the distribution of the sample by year for the voluntary disclosure of ICWs incentives 
sample.  Table 2 Panel C presents the distribution of the sample by year for the IPO offer 
price sample.  Table 3 Panel D presents the distribution of the sample by year for the 
SOX 404 material weaknesses sample.  Table 3 Panel E presents the sample distribution 
by year for the SOX 404 material weaknesses market reaction sample.  Table 3 Panel F 
presents the distribution of the sample by year for the subsequent misstatement sample.  
Table 3 Panels B-F indicate lower IPO activity in 2008 and 2009 coinciding with the 
financial crisis.     
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables.  In the pooled voluntary disclosure of ICWs incentives sample (Panel A), 27 
percent of the registrants voluntarily disclosed an ICW in their IPO registration 
statements ICW_REGISTRANT.  The percentage of observations that hired a new CEO 
at the IPO date is 60 percent, and the mean (median) CEO age at the IPO date is 50.06 
(50.00) years, respectively.  Approximately 43 percent of IPO registrants operate in high 
litigation industries LIT, and the mean (median) of LN_MV is 19.87 (19.79), 
respectively.  On average, 13 percent of IPO registrants include restated financial 
statements in their registration statement REST_REGISTRANT.  The mean (median) of 
LN_AGE, at the IPO date, is 2.24 (2.20) years, respectively.  The majority of IPO 
registrants engage BIGN auditors, and the mean (median) of LN_TA is 5.20 (4.99), 
respectively.   
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In the entropy balanced IPO offer price sample (Panel B), the mean (median) IPO 
price is $15.03 ($14.00), respectively.  Approximately 26 percent of the registrants 
voluntarily disclosed an ICW in their IPO registration statements ICW_REGISTRANT.  
The mean (median) portion of NET_PROCEEDS retained by the registrant is 0.79 (0.93), 
respectively.  The mean (median) underwriter share of IPO proceeds underwritten, 
UW_SHARE, is 0.08 (0.05), respectively.  
In the pooled SOX 404 material weaknesses sample (Panel C), 32 percent of the 
registrants voluntarily disclosed an ICW in their IPO registration statements 
ICW_REGISTRANT.  The percentage of observations that recorded a LOSS is 37 
percent and the mean (median) registrant age at the first SOX 404 auditor opinion date is 
2.06 (2.08) years, respectively.  Approximately 46 percent of IPO registrants operate in 
high litigation industries LIT.  On average, 55 percent of IPO registrants have foreign 
operations FOREIGN.  The mean (median) of LN_TA, at the first SOX 404 auditor 
opinion date, is 5.91 (5.79), respectively.  The majority of IPO registrants engage BIGN 
auditors, and the approximately 63 percent of auditor opinions include an explanatory 
paragraph stating that the auditor was not engaged to audit internal control over financial 
reporting, and accordingly does not express an opinion, AU9550.   
 In the entropy balanced cumulative abnormal returns sample (Panel D), 27 
percent of the registrants voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their IPO registration statements 
and had unqualified SOX 404 opinions VICW_CLEAN.  Approximately two percent of 
registrants voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their IPO registration statements and had 
adverse SOX 404 opinions VICW_ADVERSE.  The percentage of IPO registrants that 
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are accelerated filers, ACCEL, is 92 percent.  The mean (median) number of geographic 
segments, LN_GEOSEG, is 1.15 (1.10), respectively.   
In the pooled subsequent misstatements sample (Panel E), 24 percent of the 
registrants comprise the voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their IPO registration statements 
group, VICW.  Approximately ten percent of the registrants are in the VICW_REST 
group that voluntarily disclosed ICWs in IPO registration statements and misstated post-
IPO financial statements within three years of the IPO date.  The REST group that 
misstated post-IPO financial statements within three years of the IPO date is 
approximately 21 percent of the sample.  Approximately 43 percent of IPO registrants 
operate in high litigation industries LIT, and the mean (median) of LN_TA is 6.26 (6.14), 
respectively.  On average, 62 percent of the auditor opinions include an explanatory 
paragraph stating that the auditor was not engaged to audit internal control over financial 
reporting, and accordingly does not express an opinion, AU9550.  The majority of IPO 
registrants engage BIGN auditors, and 55 percent of the SOX 404 auditor opinions 
occurred after the passage of AS 5, AS5_404. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
4.2 Voluntary ICW Disclosure Incentives  
I estimate equation (1) to examine the association between management’s 
incentive to increase disclosure credibility and voluntary disclosure of ICWs in IPO 
registration statements. Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates and z-statistics from 
estimating equation (1) using logistic regression. NEWCEO and CEOAGE are included 
in columns (1) and (2) respectively.  Column (3) includes both management credibility 
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proxies simultaneously.  The area under the ROC curves in columns (1), (2), and (3) 
suggests the models are a reasonable fit (0.693, 0.682, and 0.694, respectively), following 
Lemeshow and Hosmer (1982). Additionally, the Pearson goodness-of-fit statistic fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that the models are a good fit (0.191, 0.231, and 0.182, 
respectively).  All p-values in the table are one-tailed.9    
 [INSERT TABLE 5]  
In column (1) the coefficient for NEWCEO (z-stat, 2.567) is positive and 
significant suggesting that new CEOs are more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in 
their IPO registration statement.  The positive coefficient for LIT (z-stat, 1.753) indicates 
a positive association between litigation risk and voluntary disclosure of ICWs in IPO 
registration statements.  The negative coefficient for LN_TA (z-stat, -2.419) suggests that 
larger registrants are less likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration 
statements. The positive coefficient for REST_REGISTRANT (z-stat, 5.688), consistent 
with prior research, (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Kinney and McDaniel 1989), indicates 
a positive association between IPO registration statements including restated financial 
statements and voluntarily disclosing ICWs.  The positive coefficient for FOREIGN (z-
stat, 3.170) suggests that registrants with foreign operations are more likely to voluntarily 
disclosing ICWs in their IPO registration statements.   
In column (2), the coefficient on CEOAGE is not significant suggesting no 
association between CEOs’ conservatism and risk aversion and voluntarily disclosing 
ICWs.  The positive coefficients for LIT (z-stat, 1.675), REST_REGISTRANT (z-stat, 
                                                 
9  No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables 
using the Belsley, Kuh, and Welsh (1980) approach. 
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5.361), and FOREIGN (z-stat, 3.267) continue to suggest a positive association between 
registrants’ litigation risk, prior restated financial statements, and foreign operations and 
voluntary disclosure of ICWs.  The negative coefficient for LN_TA (z-stat, -2.288) 
continues to suggest that larger registrants are less likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in 
their IPO registration statements. 
In column (3), the NEWCEO (z-stat, 2.562) coefficient continues to be positive 
and significant while CEOAGE continues to be insignificant.  The coefficients on LIT, 
LN_TA, REST_REGISTRANT, and FOREIGN are consistent with results in columns 
(1) and (2). In combination, Table 5 suggests that new CEOs who are likely to have 
greater incentives to establish disclosure credibility are also more likely to disclose ICWs 
voluntarily in their IPO registration statements. Litigation risk, prior restatements, and 
foreign operations are also positively associated with disclosing ICWs in IPO registration 
statements.  Larger registrants are less likely to disclose ICWs in IPO registration 
statements. 
4.3 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO Offer Prices  
I estimate equation (2) to examine the association between IPO offer prices and 
voluntary ICW disclosures. Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates and t-statistics of 
estimating equation (2) using OLS. I include ICW_REGISTRANT in column (1) and 
MW_ONLY, SD_ONLY, and CD_ONLY in column (2).  All p-values in the table are 
two-tailed. I do not report the coefficients for the year fixed effects for brevity.10    
 [INSERT TABLE 6] 
                                                 
10  No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables 
using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach. 
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In column (1), the coefficient on ICW_REGISTRANT (t-stat, 2.075) is positive 
and significant suggesting that underwriters assign a higher IPO offer price to registrants 
that disclose ICWs.  This result suggests that credibility efforts may be successful. 
Consistent with prior literature the coefficient for EPS (t-stat, 5.251) is positive and 
significant indicating a positive association between profitable registrants and higher IPO 
offer prices.  The positive and significant coefficient for BV (t-stat, 2.437) suggests a 
positive association between IPO registrants with a higher book value of equity and 
higher IPO offer prices.  The coefficient for UW_SHARE (t-stat, 4.064) is positive and 
significant suggesting a positive association between registrants that hire underwriting 
firms that underwrite a larger proportion of IPOs and higher IPO offer prices.  The 
coefficient for LIT (t-stat, -5.317) is negative and significant suggesting a negative 
association between IPO registrants operating in high litigation industries and lower IPO 
offer prices. The coefficient for CEOAGE (t-stat, -3.961) is negative and significant 
suggesting a negative association between IPO registrants led by older CEOs and lower 
IPO offer prices.  This finding is consistent with prior research suggesting that investor 
perceptions influence registrants’ valuations (Blankespoor, Hendricks, and Miller 2015). 
Blankespoor et al. (2015) find a negative association between CEO age and investor 
perceptions of IPO registrants. 
 I next examine the relation between the types of ICW disclosed in the IPO 
registration statement and IPO offer prices in column (2). I find a positive and significant 
coefficient on MW_ONLY (t-stat, 2.788) suggesting a positive association between IPO 
registrants that disclose material weaknesses and higher IPO offer prices.  The 
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coefficients for EPS, BV, UW_SHARE, LIT, and CEOAGE are consistent with results in 
Column (1).  In combination, Table 6 suggests a positive association between voluntary 
ICW disclosures and higher IPO offer prices. These results suggest that underwriters are 
comfortable with efforts to disclose internal control problems early. 
4.4 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material Weaknesses  
Table 7 presents the coefficient estimates and z-statistics for the Firth logistic 
estimation of equation (3) using ICW_404 as the dependent variable.  In column (1) 
ICW_404 is an indicator variable for those companies whose auditors provide an adverse 
opinion in their first SOX 404 report.  All p-values in the table are one-tailed.  I do not 
report the coefficients for the year and industry fixed effects for brevity.11   
[INSERT TABLE 7] 
In column (1), the coefficient for ICW_REGISTRANT (z-stat, 2.509) is positive 
and significant suggesting registrants that voluntarily disclose internal control 
deficiencies in their IPO registration statements have a higher likelihood of post-IPO 
material weaknesses.  As expected, the model includes a positive and significant 
coefficient on LOSS (z-stat, 2.246) suggesting that unprofitable companies have a higher 
likelihood of post-IPO material weaknesses. Consistent with prior literature, the 
coefficient on FOREIGN (z-stat, 1.450) is positive and significant suggesting that 
companies that are more complex have a higher likelihood of post-IPO material 
weaknesses.  In combination, the Table 7 results provide evidence that registrants that 
                                                 
11  No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables 
using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach. 
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voluntarily disclose internal control deficiencies in their registration statements have a 
higher likelihood of reporting post-IPO SOX 404 material weaknesses. 
4.5 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Market Reaction to Subsequent SOX 404 
Material Weakness  
I estimate equation (4) to examine the association between cumulative abnormal 
returns at the SOX 404 audit report filing date and voluntary ICW disclosures in 
registration statements. Table 8 presents the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from 
estimating equation (4) using OLS.  I do not report the coefficients for the year and 
industry fixed effects for brevity.12  All p-values in the table are two-tailed. 
 [INSERT TABLE 8] 
 In column (1), the negative coefficient for VICW_ADVERSE (t-stat -1.852) 
suggests that investors respond negatively when registrants voluntarily disclose ICWs in 
their IPO registration statement and receive an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion in the 
first year of SOX 404 compliance.  This finding suggests investors are surprised by an 
adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion when ICWs are disclosed at the IPO date because 
investors expect the ICWs to be remediated once disclosed. Prior research suggests that 
the market does not react to SOX 404 disclosures (Beneish et al. 2008).  However, prior 
studies do find that the market reacts to SOX Section 302 voluntary disclosures of ICWs 
(Kim and Park 2009; Franco et al. 2005; Hammersley et al. 2008).  Specifically, 
Hammersley et al. (2008) suggest the severity of ICWs, management’s conclusion 
regarding the effectiveness of the controls, the audibility of the ICWs, and the vagueness 
                                                 
12  No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables 
using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach. 
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of the voluntary disclosure is informative in explaining market reactions to ICW 
disclosures.  The sample registrants that received an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion 
disclosed the same ICWs in both the IPO registration statement and their annual report 
associated with the adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion.  Thus, the negative reaction 
associated with VICW_ADVERSE suggests investors perceive the voluntarily disclosed 
ICWs at the IPO as severe or pervasive because remediation did not occur before the 
SOX 404 auditor assessment.  For those registrants that received unqualified SOX 404 
auditor opinions, the cumulative abnormal returns did not differ from IPO registrants that 
did not disclose ICWs in their registration statements and received an unqualified SOX 
404 audit report.  This result suggests that subsequent remediation of the disclosed ICW 
likely improves managements’ disclosure credibility. The positive coefficient for ACCEL 
(t-stat, 1.730) suggests that investors respond positively to those registrants that are 
accelerated filers.  In combination, Table 8 results suggest management’s attempts to 
increase disclosure credibility is unsuccessful when disclosures do not also result in 
remediation.  
4.6 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent Misstatements  
Table 9 presents the coefficient estimates, z-statistics, and odds ratios from the 
logistic regression comparing the determinants of IPO registrants that have indicators of 
degrading financial reporting quality with IPO registrants with no indicators of degrading 
financial statement quality.  The base group is registrants that do not voluntarily disclose 
ICWs in the IPO registration statement and report no post-IPO internal control 
deficiencies or misstatements. The remaining three groups are registrants that voluntarily 
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disclose ICWs in IPO registration statements (VICW), disclose ICWs in IPO registration 
statements and misstate post-IPO financial statements within three years of the IPO date 
(VICW_REST), and misstate post-IPO financial statements within three years of the IPO 
date (REST).  Column (1) presents the coefficient estimates, z-statistics, and odds ratios 
for VICW registrants. Column (2) presents the coefficient estimates, z-statistics, and odds 
ratios for VICW_REST registrants.  Column (3) presents the coefficient estimates, z-
statistics, and odds ratios for REST registrants.  All p-values in the table are two-tailed.13      
 [INSERT TABLE 9]  
In column (1) the coefficient for LN_TA (z-stat, 2.471) is positive and significant 
suggesting larger registrants compared to the base group are 28.7 percent more likely to 
voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements. 14  Also, the positive 
coefficient for INVREC (z-stat, 3.127) suggests that registrants with a higher ratio of 
accounts receivables and inventory to total assets compared to the base group are 789.8 
percent more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration statements.  
The negative coefficient for AU9550 (z-stat, -2.308) suggests that compared to the base 
group registrants whose IPO audit report included in the IPO registration contains non-
standard language in accordance with AU Section 9550 are 38.2 percent less likely to 
voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements.  The positive coefficient 
for FOREIGN (z-stat, 2.757) suggests that registrants that are more complex compared to 
                                                 
13  No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables 
using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach. 
14  The odds ratio is used to determine the likelihood of an outcome with respect to the base group.  To 
determine the likelihood for determinants that are positively related to the outcome, subtract 1 from the 
odds ratio.  For determinants that are negatively related to the outcome, subtract the odds ratio from 1 to 
determine the likelihood.  For example, LN_TA is 28.7 percent more likely to be a VICW outcome (1.287 -
1) = 0.287. 
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the base group are 93.9 percent more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO 
registration statements.  The positive coefficient for AS5_404 (z-stat, 4.114) suggests that 
compared to the base group registrants completing their IPO after the passage of AS 5 are 
171.5 percent more likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration 
statements.  The negative coefficient for BODSIZE (z-stat, -3.558) suggests that 
registrants with larger boards of directors compared to the base group are 23.7 percent 
less likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration statements.  The negative 
coefficient for NAS (z-stat, -2.465) suggests that compared to the base group registrants 
with a greater proportion of non-audit service fees to total fees are 84.7 percent less likely 
to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration statements. 
In column (2) the negative coefficient for INVREC (z-stat, -2.286) suggests that 
registrants with a higher ratio of accounts receivables and inventory to total assets 
compared to the base group are 91.0 percent less likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in 
their IPO registration statements and misstate their financial statements within three years 
after the IPO.  Approximately one percent of registrants stated that accounts receivable 
and/or inventory were both an ICW in the IPO registration statement and one of multiple 
accounting rule application failures leading to the misstatement. The positive coefficient 
for Z (z-stat, 1.705) is not related to the likelihood of disclosing ICWs in their IPO 
registration statements and misstating their financial statements within three years after 
the IPO.  Also, the negative coefficient on BIGN (z-stat, -2.400) suggests that IPO 
registrants that hire Big N auditors compared to the base group are 60.0 percent less 
likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements and misstate their 
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financial statements within three years after the IPO.  The positive coefficient for 
FOREIGN (z-stat, 1.957) suggests that registrants that are more complex compared to the 
base group are 191.1 percent more likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO 
registration statements and misstate their financial statements within three years after the 
IPO.  The negative coefficient for AS5_404 (z-stat, -3.048) suggests that compared to the 
base group those registrants completing their IPO after the passage of AS 5 are 10.1 
percent less likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements and 
misstate their financial statements within three years after the IPO.   
In column (3) the negative coefficient for INVREC (z-stat, -1.842) suggests that 
compared to the base group registrants with a higher ratio of accounts receivables and 
inventory to total assets are 75.6 percent less likely to misstate their financial statements 
within three years after the IPO.  In both columns 2 and 3 the sign on the coefficient for 
INVREC is inconsistent with prior literature that suggests INVREC is a significant 
predictor of misstatements. In a manual screening of the misstatement registrants, one 
percent of the registrants’ misstatements relate exclusively to inventory.  Approximately 
five percent of registrants stated that accounts receivable and/or inventory were one of 
multiple accounting rule application failures leading to the misstatement.  Thus, the 
likelihood of a misstatement relating to inventory is low in this sample.  The positive 
coefficient for AU9550 (z-stat, 2.006) suggests that compared to the base group 
registrants whose IPO audit report included in the IPO registration contains non-standard 
language consistent with AU Section 9550 are 57.4 percent more likely to misstate their 
financial statements within three years after the IPO. The negative coefficient for 
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AS5_404 (z-stat, -4.147) suggests that compared to the base group those registrants 
completing their IPO after the passage of AS 5 are 58.5 percent less likely to misstate 
their financial statements within three years after the IPO.  Given the results in Table 9, I 
now compare the regression coefficients across the three indicators of degrading financial 
reporting quality using seemingly unrelated estimation. 
4.7 Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of Degrading Financial Reporting Quality 
Groups 
 I test for differences in the VICW, VICW_REST, and REST groups of degrading 
financial reporting quality because some of the control variables are significant for 
multiple degrading financial reporting quality groups.  I examine whether the controls 
that are significant for multiple degrading financial reporting quality groups are a 
stronger predictor for inclusion in any one of the three groups.  I use seemingly unrelated 
estimation (SUEST) (Zellner 1962) by estimating equation (5) separately for the three 
groups and testing the equality of the coefficients.  SUEST combines the parameter 
estimates and covariance matrices of the three models into a single parameter vector and 
simultaneous covariance matrix, allowing for cross-testing hypotheses. The advantage of 
this method over a regression that pools the groups is that that it does not assume equal 
residual variance between the three groups or constrain coefficients to be equal. 
[INSERT TABLE 10] 
Table 10 presents the coefficient estimates and tests of differences in the 
coefficients across the groups using SUEST to determine which company characteristics 
have the largest effect on being in one of the degrading financial reporting quality groups. 
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Tests of differences between the VICW and VICW_REST groups indicate that LN_TA, 
INVREC, Z, BIGN, AU9550, FOREIGN, AS5_404, BODSIZE, DUALCEO, and NAS 
differ between the VICW and VICW_REST groups.  Larger companies (LN_TA) and 
companies with higher inventory and receivables to total assets ratios (INVREC) 
positively predict the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration 
statements.  Companies that have foreign operations (FOREIGN) or complete their IPO 
after AS 5 (AS5_404) positively predict the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures 
in IPO registration statements.  Companies with more board members (BODSIZE) and 
companies with a higher proportion of non-audit service fees to total audit fees (NAS) 
negatively predict the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration 
statements.  Companies that hire Big N auditors (BIGN) or include an explanatory 
paragraph disclaiming an auditor opinion on internal control over financial reporting 
(AU9550) negatively predict the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO 
registration statements.15    
Statistical tests of the models indicate that LN_TA, INVREC, AU9550, 
FOREIGN, AS5_404, BODSIZE, and NAS are statistically different between the VICW 
and REST groups.  Larger companies (LN_TA) and companies with higher inventory and 
receivables to total assets ratios (INVREC) continue to predict the choice to include 
voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements.  Companies that have foreign 
operations (FOREIGN) or complete their IPO after AS 5 (AS5_404) continue to predict 
                                                 
15 Companies’ Z scores (Z) and CEOs that are the Chairman of the board of directors (DUALCEO) are 
statistically significantly different between the VICW and VICW_REST groups. However, neither Z nor 
DUALCEO are significant predictors of the two groups. 
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the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements.  
Companies with more board members (BODSIZE) and companies with a higher 
proportion of non-audit service fees to total audit fees (NAS) continue to predict the 
choice to exclude voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements.  Companies 
that include an explanatory paragraph disclaiming an auditor opinion on internal control 
over financial reporting (AU9550) continue to predict the choice to exclude voluntary 
ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements. 
 Statistical tests of the models indicate that INVREC, BIGN, AS5_404, and 
BODSIZE are statistically different between the VICW_REST and REST groups.  
Companies with higher inventory and receivables to total assets ratios (INVREC) or more 
board members (BODSIZE) negatively predict including voluntary ICW disclosures in 
IPO registration statements and misstating financial statements within three years of the 
IPO.  Companies that hire Big N auditors (BIGN), or complete their IPO after AS 5 
(AS5_404) are less likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration 
statements and to misstate financial statements within three years of the IPO. 
CHAPTER 5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
5.1 Self-Selection Correction – IPO Valuation 
Because registrants’ decisions to voluntarily disclose ICWs is a function of many 
factors, the choice to disclose ICWs voluntarily is non-random and thus generates the 
potential for selection bias. To control for this potential selection bias, I estimate the 
average treatment effect of IPO registrants that disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO 
registration statements on their IPO offer price using ETREGRESS from STATA (Cerulli 
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2014; Peel 2014).  ETREGRESS estimates the average treatment effect on the treated 
observations (i.e., disclose ICWs voluntarily) when the outcome (i.e., IPO offer price) 
may not be conditionally independent of the treatment. Using this approach, I first model 
the choice to disclose ICWs as a function of registrant characteristics, using the following 
treatment model:  
TREAT (ICW_REGISTRANT) = β0 + β1IND_PRESSURE + β2NEWCEO + 
β3CEOAGE + β4LN_MV + β5LIT + β6LN_TA + β7BIGN + β8LN_AGE + 
β9VC_BACKED + β10PE_BACKED + β11CARVEOUT + β12NASDAQ + β13GC + 
β14REST_REGISTRANT + β15LN_BUSSEG + β16FOREIGN + β17GDWLIP + 
β18WDP + β19AUDITOR_CHG + ε    (6)  
  
The dependent variable in equation (6), ICW_REGISTRANT, is an indicator variable 
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient 
internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its 
registration statement.  The treatment model includes an instrumental variable that affects 
the binary decision to obtain treatment (Maddala 1983).  I use industry pressure 
(IND_PRESSURE) as the instrumental variable in the treatment equation because the 
proportion of IPO registrants in the same industry that voluntarily disclose ICWs in their 
registration statements should not affect the IPO offer price; however, it is associated 
with the decision to voluntarily disclose ICWs.  I calculate IND_PRESSURE as ratio of 
the number of registrants voluntarily disclosing ICWs in their registration statements for 
each Fama-French industry classification minus one divided by the total number of IPO 
registrants in the industry.  The (untabulated) correlation between IND_PRESSURE and 
choosing to voluntarily disclose ICWs (ICW_REGISTRANT), is 0.13 and is significant 
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(p-value = <0.001), while the (untabulated) correlation between IND_PRESSURE and 
LN_IPO_PRICE is -0.23 (p-value = <0.001).16  
The decision to disclose ICWs voluntarily is a function of various registrant 
characteristics; therefore, in the treatment model, I control for registrant characteristics 
that potentially affect IPOs’ choices to disclose ICWs voluntarily.  I control for 
NEWCEO, CEOAGE, LN_MV, LIT, LN_TA, BIGN, LN_AGE, VC_BACKED, 
PE_BACKED, CARVEOUT, NASDAQ, GC, REST_REGISTRANT, LN_BUSSEG, 
FOREIGN, GDWLIP, WDP, AUDITOR_CHG because prior research suggests that the 
choice to voluntarily disclose ICWs in IPO registration statements is associated with 
CEO characteristics, litigation risk, the registrants’ auditors and capital providers, and 
other registrant characteristics (Jain and Tabek 2008; Venkataraman et al. 2008; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Krishnan 2005; Goh 2009; Rice and 
Weber 2012; Beatty 1989; Beatty and Welch 1996; Hogan 1997; Mayhew and Wilkins 
2003; Lou and Vasvari 2013; Gompers and Lerner 2000; Wallin and Dahlstrand 2006; 
Willenborg and McKeown 2001; Kinney and McDaniel 1989). The predictions for the 
control variables in equation (6) are consistent with those documented in the Voluntary 
ICW Disclosure Incentives section above.  Appendix B provides a summary of all 
variables.   
                                                 
16 The correlations suggest endogeneity between the instrumental variable (IND_PRESSURE) and the 
second stage outcome (LN_IPO_PRICE).  Accordingly, I use a series of methods for treatment -effects 
estimation under treatment endogeneity that use only conditional-moment restrictions (Cerulli 2014; Peel 
2014).   
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In the outcome model, I examine the average treatment effect of those registrants 
that disclose ICWs voluntarily on registrants’ IPO valuations.  I use the following OLS 
model: 
LN_IPO_PRICE = β0 + β1 ICW_REGISTRANT + β2EPS + β3BV + 
β4NET_PROCEEDS + β5UW_SHARE + β6BIGN + β7LN_AGE + β8LIT + 
β9NEWCEO + β10CEOAGE + β11LAMDA + YearFE + ε     (7) 
 
where LN_IPO_PRICE, the dependent variable in equation (7), is the logarithmic 
transformation of the IPO offer price.  The variable of interest, ICW_REGISTRANT, is 
an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily 
disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or 
control deficiency) in its registration statement. 
I control for EPS, BV, NET_PROCEEDS, UW_SHARE, BIGN, LN_AGE, LIT, 
NEWCEO, and CEOAGE because prior research suggests that IPO offer prices are 
associated with information in the prospectus and risk (Klein 1996; Beatty et al. 2000; 
Blankespoor et al. 2015). The predictions for the control variables in the model are 
consistent with those documented in the Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and IPO Offer 
Prices section above.  I include the LAMDA from equation (6) to control for the potential 
selection bias related to the association between the choice to include voluntary ICW 
disclosures in IPO registration statements and IPO offer prices.  I also include year fixed 
effects to control for cross-sectional variation in IPO offer prices by year.  Appendix B 
provides a summary of all variables.   
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Table 11 presents the results of estimating equation (6) predicting the likelihood 
of a registrant including voluntary ICW disclosures in their IPO registration statements. 
All p-values in the table are one-tailed.17   
[INSERT TABLE 11] 
The coefficient for IND_PRESSURE (z-stat, 1.922), is positive and significant 
suggesting that the probability that a registrant includes voluntary ICW disclosures 
increases as the proportion of other registrants within the same industry increases.  I also 
find positive and significant coefficients for the NEWCEO (z-stat, 2.320), LN_MV (z-
stat, 1.780), REST_REGISTRANT (z-stat, 5.068), and FOREIGN (z-stat, 2.913) control 
variables.  These coefficients suggest that the probability that a registrant includes 
voluntary ICW disclosures increases as the registrants’ market value of equity increases 
as well as when registrants hire a new CEO, restate prior financial statements, and have 
foreign operations.  I find a negative and significant coefficient for LN_TA (z-stat, -
1.894) suggesting larger registrants are less likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures.   
Table 12 presents the results of estimating equation (7) using the logarithmic 
transformation of the IPO offer price as the dependent variable and whether the 
registrants voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their registration statements. Because I do not 
make directional predictions, all p-values in the tables are two-tailed. The coefficients on 
the year fixed effects are not reported for brevity.18 Column (1) presents the results on the 
                                                 
17 I also examine multi-collinearity for this equation using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach and find no 
evidence of degrading collinearity. 
18 I also examine multi-collinearity for this equation using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach and find no 
evidence of degrading collinearity. 
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association between registrants’ IPO offer prices and disclosing ICWs voluntarily in IPO 
registration statements.    
[INSERT TABLE 12] 
In column (1), the coefficient for ICW_REGISTRANT (t-stat, 2.353) is positive 
and suggests that disclosing ICWs voluntarily in IPO registration statements is associated 
with higher IPO offer prices.  The coefficients for EPS (t-stat, 5.419), BV (t-stat, 3.032), 
and UW_SHARE (t-stat, 4.943) are positive and significant. Thus, having higher 
earnings per share, a higher book value of equity and being represented by underwriters’ 
with a higher proportion of market share of IPOs positively affects registrants’ IPO 
valuations (Klein 1996; Beatty et al. 2000).  The coefficients for LIT (t-stat, -5.814) and 
CEOAGE (t-stat, -2.926) are negative and significant.  Thus, those registrants that 
operate in high litigation industries and hire older CEOs have lower IPO offer prices, 
which is consistent with prior literature.  The LAMDA (t-stat, -1.859) is negative and 
significant suggesting that a standard OLS model would produce downwardly biased 
estimates (Cong and Drukker 2000).  The estimated correlation (rho) between the 
treatment (ICW_REGISTRANT) and the outcome equation residual is -0.340.  This 
suggests that when unobservable factors increase an IPO offer price, the registrants’ 
propensity to voluntarily disclose ICWs decreases (and vice versa).  In combination, 
these results suggest that IPO offer prices are higher for those registrants that disclose 
ICWs voluntarily.  
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5.2 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material Weaknesses 
To supplement my primary analyses, I perform one additional analysis for the 
subsequent SOX 404 material weakness sample. The primary analysis includes a control 
for the registrants’ Z-scores.  After I winsorize the Z variable, the range of Z-scores 
remains skewed. In my additional analysis (untabulated), I remove the Z control variable 
and re-estimate equation (3). When re-estimating equation (3), I continue to find a 
positive and significant coefficient on ICW_REGISTRANT (coefficient, 0.848; z-stat, 
2.486), LOSS (coefficient, 0.904; z-stat, 2.488), and FOREIGN (coefficient, 0.751; z-stat, 
1.929).  I continue to find a negative and significant coefficient on LIT (coefficient, -
0.661; z-stat, -1.871. These results suggest that my subsequent SOX 404 material 
weakness sample results are not a function of registrants’ Z-scores. 
5.3 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent Misstatements  
To supplement my primary analyses, I perform one additional analysis for the 
indicators of degrading financial reporting quality sample. The primary analysis includes 
a control for the registrants’ Z-scores.  After I winsorize the Z variable, the range of Z-
scores remains skewed. In my additional analysis (untabulated), I remove the Z control 
variable and re-estimate equation (5).  
For the VICW group, I continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on 
LN_TA (coefficient, 0.249; z-stat, 2.440), INVREC (coefficient, 2.168; z-stat, 3.106), 
FOREIGN (coefficient, 0.655; z-stat, 2.734), and AS5_404 (coefficient, 1.017; z-stat, 
4.197).  I continue to find a negative and significant coefficient on AU9550 (coefficient, -
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0.475; z-stat, -2.282), BODSIZE (coefficient, -0.272; z-stat, -3.582), and NAS 
(coefficient, -1.860; z-stat, -2.542).  
For the VICW_REST group, I find a positive and significant coefficient on 
FOREIGN (coefficient, 1.107; z-stat, 2.398), LN_BUSSEG (coefficient, 0.664; z-stat, 
1.744), and LIT (coefficient, 1.260; z-stat, 2.672).  I find a negative and significant 
coefficient on CR (coefficient, -0.218; z-stat, -1.910), INVREC (coefficient, -4.054; z-
stat, -2.816), BIGN (coefficient, -1.597; z-stat, -3.364), and AS5_404 (coefficient, -0.691; 
z-stat, -1.697). 
For the REST group, I continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on 
AU9550 (coefficient, 0.446; z-stat, 1.975).  I continue to find a negative and significant 
coefficient on INVREC (coefficient, -1.393; z-stat, -0.069) and AS5_404 (coefficient, -
0.895; z-stat, -4.237).  These results suggest that my indicators of degrading financial 
reporting quality results are not a function of registrants’ Z-scores. 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
In this study, I first examine whether IPO registrants are more likely to disclose 
ICWs to increase management’s disclosure credibility.  The results suggest that IPO 
registrants with new CEOs who likely have greater incentives to increase disclosure 
credibility are more likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures in their registration 
statements.  
Then, I examine the association between IPO management’s voluntary disclosure 
of ICWs and IPO offer prices.  The results suggest that offer prices of IPO registrants that 
voluntarily disclose ICWs are higher than those of IPO registrants that do not disclose.  
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Thus, the voluntary ICW disclosures are informative, and underwriters do not view the 
disclosures negatively. 
Next, I examine the association between IPO management’s voluntary disclosure 
of ICWs and subsequent SOX 404 material weaknesses.  The results suggest an 
association between voluntary ICW disclosures and a higher likelihood of reported 
material weaknesses in the first SOX 404 auditor opinion.  The majority of registrants 
that voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their IPO registration statement and received adverse 
SOX 404 auditor opinions reported similar ICWs in both SEC filings.  Thus, the results 
provide evidence of an association between IPO registrants who include voluntary ICW 
disclosures in their registration statements and lower financial reporting quality after their 
offerings. 
Then, I examine the extent to which voluntary disclosure of ICWs builds 
disclosure credibility with investors when subsequent negative events occur (i.e., SOX 
404 material weakness).  Interpreting the results requires caution about the ability to 
control for contaminating information released contemporaneously, and about the 
reliance on analysts’ expectations of earnings. Subject to these limits, the evidence 
suggests that IPO registrants’ voluntary ICW disclosures are informative because 
negative cumulative abnormal returns only occur for unremediated disclosed ICWs.     
Finally, I examine the determinants of IPO registrants that have indicators of 
degrading financial reporting quality.  The results suggest that voluntarily disclosing 
ICWs is not exclusively associated with misstatements occurring within three years of the 
IPO date. Approximately 62 percent of the sample have registration statements’ auditor 
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opinions that include an explanatory paragraph disclaiming an opinion on internal control 
over financial reporting. The results suggest registrants’ whose auditor opinions include 
this explanatory paragraph are more likely to have post-IPO misstatements even when the 
auditor issued an unqualified SOX 404 opinion in the year of misstatement. This finding 
suggests no adjustments in audit procedures in years after the IPO to account for the 
increased risk related to internal controls. Overall, my findings provide evidence that 
misstatements appear to outpace material weakness disclosures for the sample of IPO  
registrants. 
This study contributes to several literature.  First, this study extends the research 
on the effects of SOX by establishing an association between the market reactions to 
SOX 404 material weakness disclosures preceded by management’s voluntary ICW 
disclosures.  Second, it offers additional evidence on the value of voluntary disclosures 
for IPO registrants.  Third, it broadens the disclosure literature by providing evidence that 
new CEOs have greater incentives to include voluntary disclosures.  This setting is 
particularly informative because it provides insights about the integrity of individual 
registrants’ financial reporting processes and management’s disclosure credibility before 
SOX 302 and SOX 404 ICW disclosures are required.  Fourth, it contributes to the audit 
literature by providing evidence of an association between voluntary disclosure of ICWs 
and a decrease in financial reporting quality. Fifth, it complements the extant literature on 
ICWs and misstatements by suggesting that misstatements are outpacing material 
weakness disclosures.  
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The results are timely and relevant to regulators because the relationship between 
misstatements and unqualified audit opinions is puzzling. Additionally, the JOBS Act 
regulation allows IPO registrants to delay SOX 404 compliance for up to five years. 
Finally, this study’s results are important to investors because the purpose of SOX 404 is 
to provide advanced warning of financial reporting weaknesses.  
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APPENDIX A 
EXAMPLES OF VOLUNTARY ICW DISCLOSURES 
 
We have had a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting. 
In connection with the preparation of our financial statements as of and for the year 
ended December 31, 2010, our independent registered public accounting firm identified a 
material weakness in internal control over financial reporting with respect to: (i) the 
period of time over which initiation fees were recognized; (ii) the amortization period 
associated with data acquisition costs; (iii) expenses related to warrants issued in 
connection with our 2008 debt facility; and (iv) the recognition of sales tax expense in 
certain states, and in each case we adjusted the results of prior periods. Specifically: 
 
• We had previously amortized initiation fees from our members over the length 
of the member contract, and we now amortize initiation fees over the expected life 
of the member based on our experience. 
• We had previously amortized data acquisition costs that we acquired over ten 
years, and we now amortize data acquisition costs over three years. 
• We had previously valued the warrant to purchase common stock issued to our 
lender in connection with our 2008 debt facility at a fixed amount negotiated with 
the lender. We revalued the warrant at its fair value at the time of grant. 
• We had not previously recognized state sales tax expense, and we now have 
adopted appropriate provisions in that regard.   
 
Under standards established by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a 
deficiency in internal control over financial reporting exists when the design or operation 
of a control does not allow management or personnel, in the normal course of performing 
their assigned functions, to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis. A material 
weakness is a deficiency or combination of deficiencies in internal control over financial 
reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of our 
annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected and corrected on 
a timely basis. While we believe that we have remediated the material weakness 
identified by our independent registered public accounting firm, we cannot assure that 
there will not be additional material weaknesses and significant deficiencies that our 
independent registered public accounting firm or we will identify. If we identify such 
issues or if we are unable to produce accurate and timely financial statements, our stock 
price may be adversely affected and we may be unable to maintain compliance with 
listing requirements of our stock exchange.   
 
In addition, we will need to evaluate our internal controls over financial reporting in 
connection with Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in our annual report for 2011, and 
our auditors will be required to attest to our internal controls over financial reporting 
starting with our annual report for 2012.  This assessment will need to include disclosure 
of any material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting identified by 
our management, as well as our auditors’ attestation report on our internal controls over 
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financial reporting. We are just beginning the costly and challenging process of 
compiling the system and processing documentation needed to comply with such 
requirements. We may not be able to complete our evaluation, testing and any required 
remediation in a timely fashion. If we identify one or more material weaknesses in our 
internal control over financial reporting during the evaluation and testing process, we will 
be unable to assert that our internal control over financial reporting is effective. If we are 
unable to assert that our internal control over financial reporting is effective, or if our 
auditors are unable to express an opinion on the effectiveness of our internal control over 
financial reporting, we could lose investor confidence in the accuracy and completeness 
of our financial reports, which could have a material adverse effect on the price of our 
common stock. 
                        ~Angie’s List, Inc. November 17, 2011 
The audit of our financial statements for each of the years ended December 31, 2002, 
2003 and 2004, identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial 
reporting, and if not corrected, these material weaknesses could result in a material 
misstatement of our results of operations or financial condition, which could harm our 
business and reputation and cause the price of our common stock to decline. 
In connection with the audit of our financial statements for each of the years ended 
December 31, 2002, 2003 and 2004, our independent registered public accounting firm 
identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting with 
respect to: 
  
• our financial closing and reporting process; 
• our inventory costing and tracking methodology; 
• our documentation supporting our accounting records; and 
• our contemporaneous documentation of significant, non-routine transactions. 
 
A material weakness is a reportable condition in which the design or operation of one or 
more accounting controls and procedures does not reduce to a relatively low likelihood 
the risk that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not 
be prevented or detected within a timely period by employees in the normal course of 
performing their assigned functions. 
 
The material weakness in our financial closing and reporting process resulted from a 
combination of the following factors: 
 
• our failure to accurately account for complex transactions; 
• our failure to monitor and apply new and emerging accounting principles 
generally accepted in the U.S., or GAAP; 
• our lack of formal processes related to the consolidation of financial information 
and the financial statement preparation process; and 
• our failure to reconcile our accounts in a timely and accurate manner. 
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The material weakness in our inventory tracking and costing methodology related to the 
method by which we had accounted for certain inventory related costs in each of 2002, 
2003 and 2004. In these years, we did not appropriately capitalize these costs in inventory 
which resulted in adjustments to our financial statements. In addition, we also did not 
have a formal process for tracking our inventory. 
 
The material weakness with respect to our accounting records related to our lack of 
supporting documentation that should have been readily available to evidence routine 
transactions, principally in 2002 and 2003. 
 
The material weakness in the documentation of significant and non-routine transactions 
related specifically to a lack of contemporaneous documentation for certain of our equity 
compensation arrangements in 2002 through 2004 and our acquisition of Foam Creations 
in 2004. 
 
We are in the process of addressing each of these material weaknesses. However, because 
these material weaknesses exist, there is a heightened risk that a material misstatement of 
our annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected. In addition, 
the remediation steps we have taken, are taking, or plan to take may not effectively 
remediate the material weaknesses, in which case our accounting controls and procedures 
in these particular areas will continue to be ineffective. 
 
Furthermore, once we become a public company, we will be required to comply with the 
requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for the year ended 
December 31, 2007 and subsequent periods. See "—We will be required to meet periodic 
reporting requirements under SEC rules and regulations, and we will incur significant 
time and expense in documenting, testing and certifying our internal control over 
financial reporting, and any deficiencies in our internal controls could adversely affect 
our business." In the event that we 
do not adequately remedy these material weaknesses, our business, reputation and 
financial condition may be adversely affected, there may be a negative reaction in the 
financial markets due to a loss of confidence in the reliability of our financial statements, 
which could cause the 
price of our common stock to decline.  
~ Crocs, Inc. February 8, 2006 
Our management and auditors have identified material weaknesses in our internal 
controls that, if not properly remediated, could result in material misstatements in our 
financial statements and the inability of our management to provide its report on the 
effectiveness of our internal controls as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
for years ending December 31, 2008 and thereafter, either of which could cause 
investors to lose confidence in our reported financial information and have a negative 
effect on the trading price of our stock. 
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We are not currently required to comply with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 and are therefore not required to make an assessment of the effectiveness of our 
internal control over financial reporting. Further, our independent registered public 
accounting firm has not been engaged to express, nor have they expressed, an opinion on 
the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting. However, in connection 
with our fiscal 2006 financial statement audit, our accounting firm informed us that they 
had identified material weaknesses in our internal controls as defined by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. 
The material weaknesses reported relate to having insufficient personnel resources with 
sufficient technical accounting expertise within our accounting function. 
 
We are taking remedial measures to improve the effectiveness of our internal controls. 
Specifically, we will be: 
 
• strengthening our internal staffing to accommodate public company 
requirements; and 
• engaging an outside compliance consulting firm to advise us on improving our 
internal controls and systems. 
 
The existence of material weaknesses is an indication that there is a more than remote 
likelihood that a material misstatement of our financial statements will not be prevented 
or detected in a future period, and the process of designing and implementing effective 
internal controls and procedures is a continuous effort that requires us to expend 
significant resources to maintain a system of internal controls that is adequate to satisfy 
our reporting obligations as a public company. We cannot assure you that the measures to 
be taken in the future will remediate the material weaknesses noted by our independent 
public accounting firm or that we will implement and maintain adequate controls over 
our financial processes and reporting in the future. In addition, we cannot assure you that 
additional material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in our internal controls will not 
be discovered in the future. If we fail to develop and maintain effective controls and 
procedures, we may be unable to provide the required financial information in a timely 
and reliable manner or otherwise comply with the standards applicable to us as a public 
company and we may not be able to provide a report on the effectiveness of our internal 
controls for the year ending December 31, 2008, or later. Any failure by us to timely 
provide the required financial information or provide a report on the effectiveness of our 
internal controls could materially and adversely impact our financial condition and the 
market value of our securities. 
 
~ NeurogesX Inc. May 2, 2007 
 
If we fail to remediate deficiencies in our internal control over financial reporting or 
are unable to implement and maintain effective internal control over financial 
reporting in the future, the accuracy, and timeliness of our financial reporting may be 
adversely affected. 
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In connection with the audits of our financial statements for 2009, 2010, and 2011, we 
identified a material weakness in the design and operating effectiveness of our internal 
control over financial reporting. A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of 
deficiencies, that creates a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of a 
company’s annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a 
timely basis.  The material weakness that we identified resulted from a lack of sufficient 
number of qualified personnel within our accounting function that possessed an 
appropriate level of expertise to effectively perform the following functions: 
 
• identify, select, and apply GAAP sufficiently to provide reasonable assurance 
that transactions were being appropriately recorded; and 
• design control activities over the financial flows and reporting processes 
necessary to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements. 
 
We are taking numerous steps that we believe will address the underlying causes of the 
control deficiencies described above, primarily through the hiring of additional 
accounting and finance personnel with technical accounting and financial reporting 
experience, development and implementation of policies, and improved processes and 
documented procedures. If we fail to effectively remediate deficiencies in our control 
environment or are unable to implement and maintain effective internal control over 
financial reporting to meet the demands that will be placed upon us as a public company, 
including the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, or the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, we may be unable to accurately report our financial results, or report them within the 
timeframes required by law or exchange regulations. 
 
Even if we are able to report our financial statements accurately and in a timely manner, 
if we do not make all necessary improvements to address the material weakness, 
continued disclosure of a material weakness will be required in future filings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, which could cause our reputation to be 
harmed and our stock price to decline. 
 
We have not performed an evaluation of our internal control over financial reporting, 
such as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, nor have we engaged our 
independent registered public accounting firm to perform an audit of our internal control 
over financial reporting as of any balance sheet date or for any period reported in our 
financial statements. Had we performed such an evaluation or had our independent 
registered public accounting firm performed an audit of our internal control over financial 
reporting, control deficiencies, including material weaknesses and significant 
deficiencies, in addition to those discussed above, may have been identified. In addition, 
we are an “emerging growth company” as defined in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups 
Act, and as such we may elect to avail ourselves of the exemption from the requirement 
that our independent registered public accounting firm audit our internal control over 
financial reporting under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act until we cease to be an 
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“emerging growth company.” See “—We are an “emerging growth company,” and any 
decision on our part to comply only with certain reduced reporting and disclosure 
requirements applicable to emerging growth companies could make our common stock 
less attractive to investors,” for additional risks relating to our “emerging growth 
company” status. 
 
~Trulia, Inc. September 20, 2012 
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APPENDIX B 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
 
Dependent Variables 
ICW_REGISTRANT Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material 
weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its 
registration statement.   
IPO_PRICE Offer price per share.   
LN_IPO_PRICE Logarithmic transformation of the IPO_PRICE. 
ICW_404 
Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
company’s auditor provides an adverse opinion in their first SOX 
404 report. 
CAR(-1,1) 
Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (equally weighted 
index) over days minus 1 and 1, where day 0 is the filing date of the 
second annual report including the first internal control over 
financial reporting opinion. 
DFRQ Categorical dependent variable in equation (5). 
VICW 
Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement, has an 
unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and 
does not have a corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned 
in the internal control over financial reporting opinion.   
VICW_REST 
Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement, has an 
unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and has 
a corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal 
control over financial reporting opinion.   
REST 
Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
does not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement, 
has an unqualified internal control of financial reporting opinion, 
and has a corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the 
internal control over financial reporting opinion. 
Variable of Interest 
NEWCEO Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the CEO 
tenure at the registrant is zero years at the IPO date. 
CEOAGE CEO age at the IPO date. 
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ICW One of the four following ICW disclosure measures: 
ICW_REGISTRANT, MW_ONLY, SD_ONLY, and CD_ONLY.   
MW_ONLY Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
voluntarily disclosed, at least, one material weakness in its 
registration statement.   
SD_ONLY Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
voluntarily disclosed, at least, one significant deficiency in its 
registration statement. 
CD_ONLY Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
voluntarily disclosed, at least, one control deficiency in its 
registration statement.   
VICW_CLEAN Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material 
weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its 
registration statement and received an unqualified SOX 404 audit 
opinion in its second annual report.   
SILENT_ADVERSE Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
did not voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls in its 
registration statement and received an adverse SOX 404 audit 
opinion in its second annual report.   
VICW_ADVERSE Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls in its 
registration statement and received an adverse SOX 404 audit 
opinion in its second annual report.    
IND_PRESSURE Ratio of the number of registrants voluntarily disclosing ICWs in 
their registration statements for each Fama-French industry 
classification minus one divided by the total number of IPO 
registrants in the industry. 
Independent Variables 
LN_TA Logarithmic transformation of total assets. 
LN_MV  Logarithmic transformation of the pre-IPO market value of equity.  
LIT Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
operates in a high litigation risk industry; high litigation risk 
industries are identified based on four-digit SIC following 
Venkataraman et al. (2008). 
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BIGN Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
has a Big N auditor obtained from the most recent audited financial 
statements prior to the IPO.   
LN_AGE Logarithmic transformation of the registrant age. 
VC_BACKED Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
is has venture capital backing. 
PE_BACKED Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
has private equity backing. 
CARVEOUT Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
is a spinoff from a public company. 
NASDAQ Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
lists on the NASDAQ exchange. 
GC Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
received a going concern opinion in the IPO registration statement. 
REST_REGISTRANT Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
restated financial statements in the IPO registration statement. 
LN_BUSSEG Logarithmic transformation of the total number of business 
segments.   
FOREIGN Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
has foreign operations.  
GDWLIP Pre-tax goodwill impairments. 
WDP Pre-tax write-downs. 
AUDITOR_CHG Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
has changed auditors since the prior audited financial statement date. 
EPS Income before operations divided by the common shares used to 
calculate earnings per share fully diluted obtained from the most 
recent audited financial statements prior to the IPO. 
BV Ratio of total common/ordinary equity, obtained from the most 
recent audited financial statements prior to the IPO, divided by the 
number of shares offered in the registration statement and this ratio 
is multiplied by 1,000.  
NET_PROCEEDS Portion of the IPO proceeds retained by the issuer divided by the 
total IPO proceeds. 
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UW_SHARE Ratio of the cumulative offer proceeds underwritten by the lead 
underwriter during the sample period divided by the aggregate offer 
proceeds for the entire sample. 
LACK_RESOURCES Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
discloses an ICW in its IPO registration statement related to an in 
sufficient complement of personnel with the appropriate level of 
knowledge, experience, and training. 
LOSS Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
has a net loss.  
CR Ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
INVREC Ratio of the sum of inventory and receivables to total assets. 
Z Altman (2000) Z score. 
DIFF_AUD Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the auditor 
changed from the IPO. 
AU9550 Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant’s IPO audit report included in the IPO registration 
contains non-standard language in accordance with AU Section 
9550 that states the auditor’s opinion does not include an opinion on 
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. 
LN_FEES Logarithmic transformation of the total audit fees. 
NAS Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees. 
BM Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. 
ACCEL Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant 
is an accelerated filer as defined by the SEC (market value of equity 
> $75 million). 
LEV Ratio of the total debt to total assets. 
BHR Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the buy-and-
hold abnormal return over the 120 days before the SOX 404 auditor 
opinion (i.e., from day -120 to -1) is less than zero.     
LN_GEOSEG Logarithmic transformation of the total number of geographic 
segments.   
SALES_GROWTH Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrants’ sales growth is in the top quintile.  
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INVT Ratio of inventory to total assets. 
UE Reported IBES earnings minus the median consensus analyst EPS 
forecast, deflated by stock price. 
NEG_ROA Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if if the 
registrant reports a negative return on assets. 
AS5_404 Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if if the 
registrant’s auditor opinion is issued after the passage of AS 5.  
BODSIZE Total number of members on the board of directors. 
DUALCEO Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the CEO is 
also the board chair. 
LAMBDA Inverse-Mills ratio. 
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Table 1 
Degrading Financial Reporting Quality Indicators Sample Composition 
Group Description Observations Sample 
% 
0 No indicators of degrading financial reporting quality 
(Base Group) 
288 45.35  
1 VICW 151 23.78  
2 VICW_REST 63 9.92  
3 REST 133 20.94  
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Table 2 
Sample Selection 
Panel A: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs Incentives 
 Description Voluntary Disclosure of 
ICWs 
1 Beginning population19 1215 
2 
Drop observations missing Compustat data for 
year-end before IPO (188) 
3 Drop observations missing BoardEx CEO data  (419) 
4 Ending sample 608 
Panel B: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and IPO Offer Prices 
 
Description SOX 404 Auditor Opinions 
1 Beginning population 608 
2 Drop observations missing Compustat data (18) 
3 Ending sample 590 
Panel C: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 Material Weaknesses 
 
Description SOX 404 Auditor Opinions 
1 Beginning population20 1042 
2 Drop observations missing Compustat data  (111) 
3 
Drop observations missing Audit Analytics data 
for second annual report filing after the IPO (146) 
4 Ending sample 785 
 
 
  
                                                 
19 The sample is restricted to registrants that originally file their registration statement with the SEC on 
form S-1 or F-1 and have subsequent Audit Analytics and Compustat data available.  Detailed sample 
procedures provided upon request. 
20 The sample is restricted to registrants that have Compustat total assets available for the second annual 
report after the IPO registration statement.  Detailed sample procedures provided upon request. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Sample Selection 
Panel D: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 Material Weaknesses Market 
Reaction 
 
Description SOX 404 Auditor Opinions 
1 Beginning population21 1042 
2 Drop observations missing Compustat data  (7) 
3 
Drop observations missing Audit Analytics data 
for second annual report filing after the IPO (113) 
4 Drop observations with missing CAR data  (159) 
5 Drop observations with missing IBES data (242) 
6 Drop observations with different ICWs 
disclosed in IPO and adverse SOX 404 auditor 
opinion  (4) 
7 Ending sample 517 
Panel E: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and Subsequent Misstatements 
 
Description SOX 404 Auditor Opinions 
1 Beginning population22 1307 
2 Drop observations missing Compustat data (181) 
3 
Drop observations with misstatement occurring 
more than three years after the IPO (324) 
4 Drop observations with SOX 404 material 
weakness related to the same year of the 
misstatement (67) 
5 Drop observations missing BoardEx data (100) 
6 Ending sample 635 
 
  
                                                 
21 The sample is restricted to registrants that have Compustat total assets available for the second annual 
report after the IPO registration statement.  Detailed sample procedures provided upon request. 
22 The sample is restricted to registrants that have Audit Analytics data available after the IPO registration 
statement.  Detailed sample procedures provided upon request. 
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Table 3 
Sample Composition 
Panel A: Classification by Industry  
FF 
Code 
Industry H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 
1 Food 8 7 15 7 4 
2 Mining and minerals 9 9 11 5 5 
3 Oil and petroleum products 50 48 68 44 55 
4 Textiles, apparel, and footwear 6 6 9 5 5 
5 Consumer durables 8 8 9 5 7 
6 Chemicals 11 11 15 9 10 
7 Consumer drugs, soap, perfumes, and 
tobacco 
21 21 41 23 19 
8 Construction and construction materials 5 4 9 6 10 
9 Steel works 3 3 6 2 2 
10 Fabricated products 1 1 2 2 - 
11 Machinery and business equipment 66 65 103 61 91 
12 Automobiles 5 4 6 3 5 
13 Transportation 19 18 50 32 38 
14 Utilities 10 9 18 12 30 
15 Retail stores 34 33 46 18 35 
16 Financial institutions 87 84 32 74 13 
17 Other 265 259 345 209 306 
 Total 608 590 785 517 635 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Sample Composition 
Panel B: Classification by Year – Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs Incentives 
  ICW_REGISTRANT 
IPO Year N n=1 Sample % 
2005 106 23 21.70% 
2006 112 27 24.11% 
2007 101 29 38.61% 
2008 19 7 36.84% 
2009 33 11 33.33% 
2010 84 24 28.57% 
2011 71 22 30.99% 
2012 71 18 25.35% 
2013 11 1  9.09% 
Panel C: Classification by Year – Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and IPO Offer Price  
  ICW_REGISTRANT 
Fiscal Year N n=1 Sample % 
2005 103 22 21.36% 
2006 107 24 22.43% 
2007 100 28 28.00% 
2008 18 6 33.33% 
2009 31 11 35.48% 
2010 83 24 28.92% 
2011 68 22 32.35% 
2012 70 18 25.71% 
2013 10 1 10.00% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Sample Composition 
Panel D: Classification by Year – Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 
Material Weaknesses  
  ICW_REGISTRANT 
Fiscal Year N n=1 Sample % 
2005 1 0 00.00% 
2006 98 23 23.47% 
2007 147 45 30.61% 
2008 142 48 33.80% 
2009 25 9 36.00% 
2010 42 17 40.48% 
2011 100 42 42.00% 
2012 87 30 34.48% 
2013 86 26 30.23% 
2014 57 12 21.05% 
Panel E: Classification by Year – Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 
Material Weaknesses Market Reaction 
  ICW_REGISTRANT 
Fiscal Year N n=1 Sample % 
2006 86 17 19.77% 
2007 141 41 29.08% 
2008 125 41 32.80% 
2009 22 6 27.27% 
2010 41 13 31.71% 
2011 92 34 36.96% 
2012 10 3 30.00% 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Sample Composition 
Panel F: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and Subsequent Misstatements 
  ICW_REGISTRANT 
Fiscal Year N n=1 Sample % 
2005 19 4 21.05% 
2006 41 10 24.39% 
2007 57 16 28.07% 
2008 66 23 34.85% 
2009 66 23 34.85% 
2010 88 33 37.50% 
2011 92 30 32.61% 
2012 103 38 36.89% 
2013 102 36 35.29% 
2014 1 1 100.00% 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs Incentives 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev     Min Q1    Q3    Max 
ICW_REGISTRANT 608    0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
NEWCEO 608    0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CEOAGE 608  50.06 50.00 7.65 27.00 45.00  55.50 70.00 
LN_MV 608  19.87 19.79 1.02 17.05 19.24 20.44 24.63 
LIT 608     0.43 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LN_TA 608    5.20 4.99 1.84 (1.80) 3.85 6.39 11.82 
BIGN 608    0.76 1.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LN_AGE 608    2.24 2.20 1.10 0.00 1.61 2.89 5.11 
VC_BACKED 608    0.41 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
PE_BACKED 608    0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CARVEOUT 608    0.08 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NASDAQ 608    0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
GC 608    0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
REST_REGISTRANT 608    0.13 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LN_BUSSEG 608    1.32 1.10 0.50 0.69 1.10 1.10 3.18 
FOREIGN 608    0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
GDWLIP 608    (2.18) 0.00 25.13    (509.35) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WDP 608 (1.83) 0.00 36.11     (899.00) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AUDITOR_CHG 608    0.60 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and IPO Offer Price 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev     Min Q1    Q3    Max 
IPO_PRICE 590 15.03 14.00 6.39 5.00 11.00 18.00 43.00 
LN_IPO_PRICE 590   2.63   2.64 0.40 1.39   2.40   2.89   4.08 
ICW_REGISTRANT 590 0.26 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
MW_ONLY 590 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
SD_ONLY 590 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CD_ONLY 590 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
EPS 590 0.32 0.08 11.51 (5.35) (0.55) 0.55 7.93 
BV 590 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.05) (0.01) 0.01 0.13 
NET_PROCEEDS 590 0.79 0.93 0.21 0.00 0.70 0.93 0.98 
UW_SHARE 590 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.21 
BIGN 590 0.76 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LN_AGE 590 2.20 2.20 1.09 0.00 1.61 2.83 5.11 
LIT 590 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
NEWCEO 590 0.60 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CEOAGE 590 49.89 50.00 7.51 35.00 44.00 55.00 68.00 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel C: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 Material Weaknesses  
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev     Min Q1    Q3    Max 
ICW_404 785 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ICW_REGISTRANT 785 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LN_TA 785 5.91 5.79 1.41 0.44 4.99 6.78 11.13 
LACK_RESOURCES 785 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LN_BUSSEG 785 1.24 1.10 0.54 0.29 1.00 1.10 3.14 
LOSS 785 0.37 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CR 785 3.60 2.52 3.66 0.31 1.48 4.30 23.94 
INVREC 785 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.24 0.92 
Z 785 128.02 4.07 501.97 0.87 2.20 13.17 3446.98 
BIGN 785 0.86 1.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DIFF_AUD 785 0.17 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LIT 785 0.46 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LN_AGE 785 2.06 2.08 1.16 0.00 1.39 2.71 5.11 
AU9550 785 0.63 1.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
FOREIGN 785 0.55 1.00 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
REST_REGISTRANT 785 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LN_FEES 785 13.68 13.72 0.84 10.52 13.18 14.16 16.68 
NAS 785 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.70 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel D: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 Material Weaknesses Market Reaction 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev     Min Q1    Q3    Max 
CAR 517 (0.01) (0.00) 0.09 (0.62) (0.04) 0.03 0.57 
VICW_CLEAN 517 0.27 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SILENT_ADVERSE 517 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
VICW_ADVERSE 517 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LN_TA 517 6.05 5.94 1.38 2.52 5.04 6.99 11.88 
BM 517 0.14 0.07 0.78 0.01 0.04 0.15 1.19 
ACCEL 517 0.92 1.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LEV 517 0.17 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.78 
BHR 517 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LN_GEOSEG 517 1.15 1.10 0.96 0.00 0.00 1.79 3.76 
FOREIGN 517 0.56 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SALES_GROWTH 517 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
INVT 517 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.49 
LOSS 517 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LN_AGE 517 2.26 2.30 1.09 0.00 1.79 2.89 5.11 
UE 517 (0.01) 0.00 0.05 (0.34) (0.00) 0.00 0.08 
DIFF_AUD 517 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel E: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and Subsequent Misstatements 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev     Min Q1    Q3    Max 
VICW 635 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
VICW_REST 635 0.10 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
REST 635 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LN_TA 635 6.26 6.14 1.58 0.62 5.18 7.31 12.02 
LN_BUSSEG 635 1.32 1.10 0.57 0.69 1.00 1.61 3.18 
NEG_ROA 635 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
CR 635 3.10 2.10 3.27 0.06 1.38 3.46 19.92 
INVREC 635 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.26 0.80 
Z 635 142.28 4.31 631.27 0.56 2.23 13.00 4666.33 
BIGN 635 0.85 1.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AUDITOR_CHG 635 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LIT 635 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
AU9550 635 0.62 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
LN_AGE 635 2.24 2.19 1.17 0.00 1.61 2.83 4.83 
FOREIGN 635 0.43 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
AS5_404 635 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
BODSIZE 635 8.03 8.00 1.57 5.00 7.00 9.00 12.00 
DUALCEO 635 0.43 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
NAS 635 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.25 0.85 
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Table 5 
Logistic Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosure Incentives 
ICW_REGISTRANT = β0 + β1NEWCEO + β2CEOAGE + β3 LN_MV + β4LIT + 
β5LN_TA + β6BIGN + β7LN_AGE + β8VC_BACKED + β9PE_BACKED + 
β10CARVEOUT + β11NASDAQ + β12GC + β13REST_REGISTRANT + β14LN_BUSSEG 
+ β15FOREIGN + β16GDWLIP + β17WDP + β18AUDITOR_CHG + ε   
 (1)  (2)                  (3) 
NEWCEO 0.554   0.554 
 (2.567)***   (2.562)*** 
CEOAGE   -0.002 -0.001 
   (-0.178) (-0.085) 
LN_MV -0.026  0.025 -0.028 
 (-0.108)  (0.107) (-0.116) 
LIT 0.243  0.229 0.241 
 (1.773)**  (1.675)** (1.755)** 
LN_TA -0.229  -0.216 -0.229 
 (-2.419)***  (-2.288)** (-2.415)*** 
BIGN -0.302  -0.365 -0.300 
 (-1.211)  (-1.479) (-1.202) 
LN_AGE 0.010  -0.011 0.011 
 (0.108)  (-0.114) (0.113) 
VC_BACKED 0.060  0.085 0.057 
 (0.189)  (0.268) (0.179) 
PE_BACKED 0.344  0.303 0.343 
 (1.242)  (1.103) (1.237) 
CARVEOUT 0.094  0.164 0.095 
 (0.243)  (0.430) (0.246) 
NASDAQ 0.022  -0.044 0.022 
 (0.093)  (-0.182) (0.093) 
GC 0.017  0.048 0.016 
 (0.061)  (0.174) (0.060) 
REST_REGISTRANT 1.533  1.411 1.531 
 (5.688)***  (5.361)*** (5.651)*** 
LN_BUSSEG 0.178  0.174 0.178 
 (0.816)  (0.806) (0.815) 
FOREIGN 0.668  0.684 0.669 
 (3.170)***  (3.267)*** (3.171)*** 
GDWLIP -0.004  -0.005 -0.004 
 (-1.197)  (-1.285) (-1.199) 
WDP -0.015  -0.022 -0.015 
 (-0.392)  (-0.562) (-0.393) 
AUDITOR_CHG 0.235  0.284 0.235 
 (1.126)  (1.370) (1.124) 
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INTERCEPT -5.923  -5.176 -5.842 
 (-2.351)***  (-1.942)** (-2.169)** 
ROC 0.693  0.682 0.694 
GOF Chi2 (p-value) 0.191  0.231 0.182 
Pseudo R-squared 0.094  0.084 0.094 
N                  608                  608                 608 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the logistic model estimation of equation (1) and z-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 
percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (one-tailed), respectively, 
and are derived from test statistics based on normal standard errors.  The dependent 
variable, ICW_REGISTRANT is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) 
if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness, 
significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement. The variables of 
interest are NEWCEO and CEOAGE. NEWCEO is an indicator variable equal to one 
(and zero otherwise) if the CEO tenure at the registrant is zero years at the IPO date.  
CEOAGE is CEO age at the IPO date.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 
and 99 percent levels. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables. 
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Table 6 
OLS Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO Offer Prices 
LN_IPO_PRICE = β0 + β1ICW + β2EPS + β3BV + β4NET_PROCEEDS + β5UW_SHARE 
+ β6BIGN + β7LN_AGE + β8LIT + β9NEWCEO + β10CEOAGE +   YearFE + ε           
   (1) (2)   
ICW_REGISTRANT 0.061    
 (2.075)**    
MW_ONLY  0.092   
  (2.788)***   
SD_ONLY  0.055   
  (0.878)   
CD_ONLY  0.200   
  (1.516)   
EPS 0.059 0.057   
 (5.251)*** (5.109)***   
BV 1.898 1.887   
 (2.437)** (2.425)**   
NET_PROCEEDS -0.051 -0.053   
 (-0.774) (-0.803)   
UW_SHARE 0.823 0.783   
 (4.064)*** (3.869)***   
BIGN 0.032 0.033   
 (0.936) (0.960)   
LN_AGE 0.016 0.018   
 (1.100) (1.235)   
LIT -0.174 -0.177   
 (-5.317)*** (-5.408)***   
NEWCEO -0.059 -0.055   
 (-1.368) (-1.265)   
CEOAGE -0.008 -0.008   
 (-3.961)*** (-4.051)***   
INTERCEPT 3.076 3.078   
 (23.780)*** (23.905)***   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes   
R-squared 0.240 0.248   
N                  590                  590   
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Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the OLS model estimation of equation (2) and t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 
percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed), respectively, 
and are derived from test statistics based on normal standard errors.  The dependent 
variable, LN_OFFER_PRICE, is the logarithmic transformation of the IPO_PRICE. The 
variables of interest ICW is one of the four following ICW disclosure measures: 
ICW_REGISTRANT, MW_ONLY, SD_ONLY, and CD_ONLY.  ICW_REGISTRANT 
is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily 
disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or 
control deficiency) in its registration statement.  MW_ONLY is an indicator variable 
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed at least one 
material weakness in its registration statement.  SD_ONLY is an indicator variable equal 
to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed at least one significant 
deficiency in its registration statement.  CD_ONLY is an indicator variable equal to one 
(and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed at least one control deficiency 
in its registration statement.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percent levels. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables. 
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Table 7 
Firth Logistic Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 
Material Weaknesses 
ICW_404 = β0 + β1ICW_REGISTRANT + β2LN_TA + β3LACK_RESOURCES + 
β4LN_BUSSEG + β5LOSS + β6CR + β7INVREC + β8Z + β9BIGN + β10DIFF_AUD + 
β11LN_AGE + β12AU9550 + β13FOREIGN + β14REST_REGISTRANT + β15LN_FEES + 
β16NAS + YearFE + IndustryFE + ε     
 (1) 
ICW_REGISTRANT 1.061 
 (2.509)*** 
LN_TA -0.053 
 (-0.266) 
LACK_RESOURCES -0.120 
 (-0.265) 
LN_BUSSEG 0.202 
 (0.619) 
LOSS 0.792 
 (2.246)*** 
CR 0.035 
 (0.882) 
INVREC 0.451 
 (0.392) 
Z -0.000 
 (-0.728) 
BIGN -0.115 
 (-0.232) 
DIFF_AUD 0.518 
 (0.785) 
LN_AGE 0.038 
 (0.242) 
AU9550 0.391 
 (1.134) 
FOREIGN 0.564 
 (1.450)* 
REST_REGISTRANT -0.204 
 (-0.463) 
LN_FEES 0.069 
 (0.218) 
NAS -1.042 
 (-0.805) 
INTERCEPT -3.720 
 (-0.995) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
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Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
N 785 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the Firth logistic model estimation of equation (3) 
and z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 
[or 1 percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (one-tailed), 
respectively, and are derived from test statistics based on normal standard errors.  The 
dependent variable, ICW_404, is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) 
if the company’s auditor provides an adverse opinion in their first SOX 404 report.  The 
variable of interest, ICW_REGISTRANT, is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material 
weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement.  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. Appendix B provides 
a summary of all variables.  
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Table 8 
OLS Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material 
Weaknesses’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
CAR (-1,1) = β0 + β1VICW_CLEAN + β2SILENT_ADVERSE + β3VICW_ADVERSE + 
β4LN_TA + β5BM + β6ACCEL + β7LEV + β8BHR +β9BIGN + β10LN_GEOSEG + 
β11FOREIGN + β12SALES_GROWTH + β13INVT + β14LOSS +β15LN_AGE + β16UE + 
β17DIFF_AUD + YearFE + IndustryFE + ε  
         (1)    
VICW_CLEAN -0.008    
 (-0.981)    
SILENT_ADVERSE -0.040    
 (-1.600)    
VICW_ADVERSE -0.041    
 (-1.852)*    
LN_TA -0.003    
 (-0.577)    
BM 0.028    
 (0.840)    
ACCEL 0.031    
 (1.730)*    
LEV 0.024    
 (1.018)    
BHR -0.004    
 (-0.475)    
BIGN -0.016    
 (-1.276)    
LN_GEOSEG 0.007    
 (1.328)    
FOREIGN 0.007    
 (0.722)    
SALE_GROWTH 0.009    
 (0.727)    
INVT 0.013    
 (0.247)    
LOSS -0.009    
 (-0.933)    
LN_AGE 0.005    
 (1.226)    
UE 0.121    
 (1.316)    
DIFF_AUD 0.011    
 (0.705)    
INTERCEPT -0.040    
 (-0.956)    
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Year Fixed Effects  Yes    
Industry Fixed Effects  Yes    
R-squared 0.052    
N                  517    
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the OLS model estimation of equation (4) and t-
statistics are in parentheses.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 
percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed), respectively, 
and are derived from test statistics based on normal standard errors.  The dependent 
variable, CAR (-1,1), is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (equally 
weighted index) over days minus 1 and 1, where day 0 is the filing date of the annual 
financial statements including an internal control over financial reporting opinion. The 
variables of interest are VICW_CLEAN, SILENT_ADVERSE, and VICW_ADVERSE. 
VICW_CLEAN, is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness, 
significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement and received an 
unqualified SOX 404 audit opinion in its second annual report.  SLIENT_ADVERSE is 
an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant did not voluntarily 
disclosed any deficient internal controls in its registration statement and received an 
adverse SOX 404 audit opinion in its second annual report.  VICW_ADVERSE is an 
indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed 
any deficient internal controls in its registration statement and received an adverse SOX 
404 audit opinion in its second annual report.  All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1 and 99 percent levels. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables. 
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Table 9 
Logistic Regression of Degrading Financial Reporting Quality Indicators 
DFRQ = β0 + β1LN_TA + β2LN_BUSSEG + β3NEG_ROA + β4CR + β5INVREC + β6Z 
+ β7BIGN + β8AUDITOR_CHG + β9LIT + β10AU9550 + β11LN_AGE + β12FOREIGN 
+ β13AS5_404 + β14BODSIZE + β15DUALCEO +β16NAS + ε 
 (1) 
VICW 
(2) 
VICW_REST 
(3) 
REST  
LN_TA 0.253 -0.071 -0.028 
 (2.471)** -(0.519) (-0.280) 
 [1.287] [-0.931] [-0.973] 
LN_BUSSEG 0.131 0.320 -0.090 
 (0.668) (1.118) (-0.431) 
 [1.140] [1.377] [-0.914] 
NEG_ROA -0.166 -0.453 0.134 
 (-0.707) (-1.398) (0.585) 
 [-0.847] [-0.635] [1.143] 
CR -0.040 -0.067 0.011 
 (-0.842) (-1.247) (0.344) 
 [-0.961] [-0.935] [1.011] 
INVREC 2.186 -2.405 -1.409 
 (3.127)*** (-2.286)** (-1.842)* 
 [8.898] [-0.090] [-0.244] 
Z 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.922) (1.705)* (-1.095) 
 [1.000] [1.000] [-1.000] 
BIGN -0.123 -0.916 0.139 
 (-0.379) (-2.400)** (0.432) 
 [-0.884] [-0.400] [1.149] 
AUDITOR_CHG -0.308 -0.309 -0.011 
 (-0.630) (-0.529) (-0.026) 
 [-0.735] [-0.734] [-0.989] 
LIT 0.210 0.416 -0.307 
 (0.855) (1.270) (-1.306) 
 [1.233] [1.515] [-0.736] 
AU9550 -0.481 -0.349 0.453 
 (-2.308)** (-1.182) (2.006)** 
 [-0.618] [-0.705] [1.574] 
LN_AGE -0.121 -0.010 0.083 
 (-1.367) (-0.072) (0.908) 
 [-0.886] [-0.990] [1.086] 
FOREGIN 0.662 0.648 0.066 
 (2.757)*** (1.957)* (0.281) 
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 [1.939] [1.191] [1.068] 
AS5_404 0.999 -0.899 -0.879 
 (4.114)*** (-3.048)*** (-4.147)*** 
 [2.715] [-0.407] [-0.415] 
BODSIZE -0.270 -0.145 -0.093 
 (-3.558)*** (-1.474) (-1.331) 
 [-0.763] [-0.865] [-0.911] 
DUALCEO -0.302 -0.417 0.142 
 (-1.414) (-1.408) (0.669) 
 [-0.739] [-0.659] [1.152] 
NAS -1.875 -0.335 0.401 
 (-2.465)** (-0.381) (0.626) 
 [-0.153] [-0.715] [1.494] 
INTERCEPT -1.169 0.829 -0.220 
 (-1.426) (0.781) (-0.285) 
 [-0.311] [2.291] [-0.803] 
ROC 0.746 0.723 0.633 
GOF Chi2 (p-value) 0.341 0.832 0.259 
Pseudo R-squared 0.119 0.086 0.048 
N 635 635 635 
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the logistic regression estimation of equation (5) 
and z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 
[or 1 percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed), 
respectively, and are derived from test statistics based on robust standard errors.  Odds 
ratios are in brackets.  See Table 1 for observation totals for the outcomes.  The 
dependent variable, DFRQ, is one of the three following categorical variables: VICW, 
VICW_REST, and REST.  VICW is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement, 
has an unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and does not have a 
corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial 
reporting opinion.  VICW_REST is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement, 
has an unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and has a 
corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial 
reporting opinion.  REST is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant does not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement, has an 
unqualified internal control of financial reporting opinion, and has a corresponding 
misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial reporting 
opinion.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. 
Appendix B provides a summary of all variables. 
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Table 10 
Tests of Coefficients in Separate Regressions of Degrading Financial Reporting Quality Groups  
DFRQ = β0 + β1LN_TA + β2LN_BUSSEG + β3NEG_ROA + β4CR + β5INVREC + β6Z + β7BIGN + 
β8AUDITOR_CHG + β9LIT + β10AU9550 + β11LN_AGE + β12FOREIGN + β13AS5_404 + 
β14BODSIZE + β15DUALCEO +β16NAS + ε 
 (1) 
VICW 
(2) 
VICW_REST 
(3) 
REST 
(1) vs (2) 
Sig Diff  
(1) vs (3) 
Sig Diff  
(2) vs (3) 
Sig Diff  
LN_TA 1.287** -0.931 -0.973 6.23‡‡ 6.13‡‡ 0.45 
LN_BUSSEG  1.140    1.377 -0.914 1.96 0.46 1.32 
NEG_ROA -0.847 -0.635 1.143 2.68 0.65 1.78 
CR -0.961 -0.935 1.011 2.30 0.99 1.06 
INVREC 8.898*** -0.090*** -0.244* 18.61‡‡‡ 13.45‡‡ 14.79‡‡ 
Z 1.000 1.000 -1.000 4.82‡ 1.74 3.29 
BIGN -0.884 -0.400** 1.149 6.65‡‡ 0.21 6.00‡‡ 
AUDITOR_CHG -0.735 -0.734 -0.989 0.74 0.39 0.24 
LIT 1.233 1.515 -0.736 3.25 2.01 2.71 
AU9550 -0.618** -0.705 1.574* 9.07‡‡ 7.22‡‡ 4.29 
LN_AGE -0.886 -0.990 1.086 2.57 2.74 0.84 
FOREIGN 1.939*** 1.191* 1.068 14.29‡‡‡ 9.70‡‡ 4.18 
AS5_404 2.715*** -0.407*** -0.415*** 22.18‡‡‡ 27.47‡‡‡ 32.66‡‡‡ 
BODSIZE -0.763*** -0.865* -0.911 14.70‡‡‡ 15.71‡‡‡ 5.61‡  
DUALCEO -0.739 -0.659 1.152 4.82‡ 1.93 2.15 
NAS -0.153*** -0.715 1.494 8.21‡‡ 7.68‡‡ 0.56 
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Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the logistic regression estimation of equation (5). 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 percent], 0.05 [or 5 
percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed), respectively, and are derived from 
test statistics based on robust standard errors.  See Table 1 for observation totals for the 
outcomes.  The dependent variable, DFRQ, is one of the three following categorical 
variables: VICW, VICW_REST, and REST.  VICW is an indicator variable equal to one 
(and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration 
statement, has an unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and does 
not have a corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over 
financial reporting opinion.  VICW_REST is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement, 
has an unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and has a 
corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial 
reporting opinion.  REST is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant does not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement, has an 
unqualified internal control of financial reporting opinion, and has a corresponding 
misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial reporting 
opinion.  Coefficient “sig diff” reported at significance levels of ‡‡‡, ‡‡, and ‡ denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 
percent] levels based on chi-square distribution using seemingly unrelated estimation 
(SUEST).  Appendix B provides a summary of all variables. 
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Table 11 
Etregress Treatment Model: Probability of Voluntary ICW Disclosures 
TREAT (ICW_REGISTRANT) = β0 + β1IND_PRESSURE + β2NEWCEO + β3CEOAGE 
+ β4LN_MV + β5LIT + β6LN_TA + β7BIGN + β8LN_AGE + β9VC_BACKED + 
β10PE_BACKED + β11CARVEOUT + β12NASDAQ + β13GC + β14REST_REGISTRANT 
+ β15LN_BUSSEG + β16FOREIGN + β17GDWLIP + β18WDP + β19AUDITOR_CHG + ε 
        (1)    
IND_PRESSURE 1.656    
 (1.922)*    
NEWCEO 0.296    
 (2.320)***    
CEOAGE 0.000    
 (-0.059)    
LN_MV 0.144    
  (1.780)*    
LIT -0.047    
 (-0.326)    
LN_TA -0.106    
 (-1.894)*    
BIGN -0.239    
 (-1.600)    
LN_AGE -0.006    
 (-0.103)    
VC_BACKED -0.047    
 (-0.244)    
PE_BACKED 0.090    
 (0.534)    
CARVEOUT 0.114    
 (0.500)    
NASDAQ 0.038    
 (0.264)    
GC 0.002    
 (0.009)    
REST_REGISTRANT 0.860    
 (5.068)***    
LN_BUSSEG 0.146    
 (1.105)    
FOREIGN 0.363    
 (2.913)***    
GDWLIP -0.003    
 (-1.212)    
WDP -0.005    
 (-0.200)    
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AUDITOR_CHG 0.121    
 (0.977)    
INTERCEPT -3.978    
 (-2.480)***    
Wald Chi2 195.270    
Prob > Chi2 0.000    
N                  590    
 
Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the linear regression model augmented with an 
endogenous binary-treatment variable estimation of equation (6) and z-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 percent], 0.05 
[or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (one-tailed), respectively, and are derived 
from test statistics based on normal standard errors.  The dependent variable, 
ICW_REGISTRANT is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the 
registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness, 
significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement. The variable of 
interest is IND_PRESSURE, which is the ratio of the number of registrants voluntarily 
disclosing ICWs in their registration statements for each Fama-French industry 
classification minus one divided by the total number of IPO registrants in the industry.  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. Appendix B 
provides a summary of all variables. 
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Table 12 
Etregress Outcome Model: OLS Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO 
Offer Prices 
LN_IPO_PRICE = β0 + β1 ICW_REGISTRANT + β2EPS + β3BV + β4NET_PROCEEDS 
+ β5UW_SHARE + β6BIGN + β7LN_AGE + β8LIT + β9NEWCEO + β10CEOAGE + 
β11LAMDA + YearFE + ε 
       (1)    
ICW_REGISTRANT 0.251    
 (2.353)**    
EPS 0.055    
   (5.419)***    
BV 2.271    
 (3.032)***    
NET_PROCEEDS -0.009    
 (-0.226)    
UW_SHARE 0.996    
 (4.943)***    
BIGN 0.034    
 (0.918)    
LN_AGE 0.018    
 (1.301)    
LIT -0.194    
 (-5.814)***    
NEWCEO -0.060    
 (-1.450)    
CEOAGE -0.006    
 (-2.926)***    
LAMDA -0.121    
 (-1.859)*    
INTERCEPT 2.878    
 (22.843)***    
Year Fixed Effects          Yes    
Wald Chi2 195.270    
Prob > Chi2 0.000    
N                  590    
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Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the linear regression model augmented with an 
endogenous binary-treatment variable estimation of equation (7) and t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 percent], 0.05 
[or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed), respectively, and are derived 
from test statistics based on normal standard errors.  The dependent variable, 
LN_OFFER_PRICE, is the logarithmic transformation of the IPO_PRICE. The variable 
of interest, ICW_REGISTRANT, is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero 
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material 
weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement.  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. Appendix B provides 
a summary of all variables. 
